

Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI)
How to advance security sector reforms with the help
of a new assessment and development framework

Heiko Borchert

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Dr. Heiko Borchert & Co.
Consulting & Research
Reckenbühlstrasse 2, CH-6005 Lucerne
T +41(0)41 312 07 40, F +41(0)41 312 07 44
hb@borchert.ch, www.borchert.ch

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Abstract

In order to tackle today's and tomorrow's security challenges, the Euro-Atlantic community needs integrated security capabilities. The Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI) proposed in this paper can help to generate, provide, and sustain the necessary network centric capabilities, while at the same time improving the security sector's democratic governance, advancing co-operability among the different security sector actors, and harmonizing international and national activities in the fields of norm-setting, planning, assessment, and assistance. To that purpose the SSRI builds on the Euro-Atlantic area's interlocking institutions and provides a systematic, process-oriented framework for assessing, planning, and developing security capabilities. It builds on processes and instruments established for the provision of military capabilities (e.g., PARP, EU Capability Development and Evaluation Mechanism, Force Goals) and transfers the underlying logic to the reform of all security sector actors, i.e., military forces, paramilitary forces, border patrols, police, and their respective organizations. The SSRI is based on the principles of self-assessment and peer review by international experts.

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1 Importance of Security Sector Reform

The end of the Cold War and the tragedy of September 11 have increased the importance of security sector reforms (SSR) around the world in general and in the Euro-Atlantic area in particular. Parallel to the shift from interstate to intrastate analysis of peace and security, the need to review the principles guiding the management, organization, and deployment of different security sector actors – e.g., military forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services and the judiciary – has come to the fore. In line with a growing body of literature on the democratic peace, the deepening and the expansion of Europe's security architecture was guided by the conviction that the quality of the international order depends on the ability of states to organize internal sovereignty along liberal democratic lines.¹ Against this background the origins of SSR stem from two main areas.² On the one hand, the development community – most prominently in the 2002 Human Development Report issued by the UN Development Program – has pointed out the key role of the security sector in a country's sustainable development.³ On the other hand, experts on civil-military relations, drawing lessons from the role of security sector actors in totalitarian and autocratic regimes, have put increased emphasis on the necessity of democratic control.⁴ The resulting SSR agenda can be summarized as follows:⁵

- Security sector organizations should be accountable both to elected civil authorities and to civil society
- Security sector organizations should operate in accordance with international law, democratic principles, and the rule of law
- Information about security sector planning and budgeting should be made available within government and to the civil society
- Mechanisms to promote security sector transparency should be institutionalized
- An environment that is favorable to the civil society's control of the security sector should be established

¹ Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE and the 'Construction' of Security in Post-Cold War Europe", *International Organization*, vol. 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 505-536.

² Timothy Edwards, *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation*. Report for the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2001, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/E-packages/ws_criteria221101/DCAF_SSR_Report1.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2003).

³ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002. Deepening democracy in a fragmented world* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 85-100.

⁴ For an overview of the relevant international criteria, see: Owen Greene, *International Standards and Obligations: Norms and Criteria for DCAF in the EU, OSCE and OECD Areas*, paper prepared for the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Security Sector Reforms", Geneva, 5-7 September 2002, <http://www.dcaf.ch/news/events/2002/CSF/CSF_Geneva_070902/Greene.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2003); Wilhelm N. Germann, *Evaluation of Security Sector Reform and Criteria of Success: Practical Needs and Methodological Problems*, Annex, paper prepared for the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Security Sector Reforms", Geneva, 5-7 September 2002, <http://www.dcaf.ch/news/events/2002/CSF/CSF_Geneva_070902/WNG_Methodological_Paper.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2003)

⁵ Nicole Ball, "Good Practices in Security Sector Reform", in Herbert Wulf (ed.), *Security Sector Reform*, BICC Brief No 15 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2000), pp. 14-22; UNDP, *Justice and Security Sector Reform* (New York: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2002), pp. 14-15; Dylan Hendrickson, *A Review of Security-Sector Reform*, The Conflict, Security & Development Group Working Papers No. 1 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1999), pp. 20-34; Theodor H. Winkler, *Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order*, DCAF Occasional Papers No. 1 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2002), pp. 10-11.

- The civil society should be consulted regularly on security sector issues such as policy guidelines, resource allocation, and other issues
- In order to play their role properly, civil society organizations should be built-up and strengthened
- A regional environment that pays attention to the legacies of war, e.g., disarmament, weapons collection, demobilization, and reintegration, should be established

Since its inception in the 1990s, SSR activities have gone through two distinct stages. First generation SSR were concerned with establishing new institutions and delineating the powers of the security sector actors and their respective political watchdogs. Second generation SSR focused on the consolidation of previous reforms and began to shift attention to the efficiency and effectiveness of reform activities.⁶ Although reforms of the first two types are still in the making, it seems time to gear up reform efforts in the Euro-Atlantic area. The new, third generation reforms described below will focus on two key issues: the provision of those capabilities that are needed to address the new security challenges and the security sector actors' ability to cooperate with each other at the national and international level (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Three generations of SSR

Two events triggered the thinking about the need to launch the third generation. First, with the declaration of St. Malo (1998) and the European Union (EU) Presidency Conclusion of Cologne (1999), the EU has embarked on the establishment of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Decisions to field a European Rapid Reaction Force were complemented by activities to bolster Europe's non-military security assets, such as police forces or civil protection capabilities.⁷ As will be argued throughout this paper, Europe's search for adequate security capabilities must be in-

⁶ Edmunds, *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation*, pp. 5-9.

⁷ Presidency Report to the Helsinki European Council on "Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence" and on "Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union, Annex IV to the Presidency Conclusions, SN 300/99, 10/11 December 1999; Presidency Report to the Feira European Council on "Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy", Annex I to the Presidency Conclusions, 19/20 June 2000. Both documents are reprinted in: Maartje Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Papers No. 47 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2001), pp. 83-91; 121-139.

terpreted as the main driver to advance security sector reforms. SSR can be used to address existing security capabilities shortfalls by adapting innovative approaches like role specialization and pooling of resources across the whole spectrum of security tasks. Second, the horrific events of September 11 have driven home the clear message that today's distinction between internal and external security risks – and the establishment of separate agencies dealing with them – is hardly adequate to deal with the new challenges.⁸ As a reaction the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have clearly linked their ability to address new security risks in general and to fight terrorism in particular with the need to increase SSR efforts.⁹ With NATO's entry into the field of SSR, respective efforts will gain in importance and public profile. Although NATO is well placed to address some SSR issues, other international organizations such as the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and international financial organizations are equally important. Rather than trying to run SSR via one organization, this paper urges the international community to make use of the interlocking institutions concept to advance SSR in a coherent way. Such a concerted approach will help to frame a Euro-Atlantic *acquis communautaire* for security affairs and thus improve the area's security and stability.¹⁰

In order to advance the third generation of SSR activities, it is important to discuss a few issues not addressed so far. To that purpose, the following sections will submit concrete proposals to:

- Define the scope of SSR activities beyond civil-military relations, thereby taking into account Europe's search for adequate security capabilities and the need for improved co-operability in the security sector (see section 21)
- Establish a review process for SSR activities (see section 22)
- Propose an international SSR plan to help individual countries with tailored assistance programs (see section 23)
- Advance cooperation among Europe's security organizations to combine and harmonize their SSR-relevant activities (see section 3)

2 Components of the Security Sector Reform Initiative

This section presents a first draft of the key elements of an international Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI). It starts with a brief discussion of three core dimensions – democratic governance, capability provision, and co-operability – and pre-

⁸ For a more detailed analysis, see: Walter B. Slocombe, *Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism: Their Impact on Security Sector Reform and Basic Democratic Values*, Paper presented to the 5th International Security Forum, Zurich, 14-16 October 2002, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isf/5/Papers/Slocombe_paper_IV.4.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2003).

⁹ Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, EAPC/PfP(PMSC)N(2002)0056, 10 September 2002, Para. 17.1.2, 17.3.1, 17.4.2.

¹⁰ Winkler, *Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order*, p. 24.

sents a detailed, open-ended list of assessment criteria (Table 1). Then the paper looks at different mechanisms that are already in place in order to develop an SSR planning and review process. Recent ideas by NATO's international staff are taken up with the aim of launching an SSR Action Plan. Finally, the set-up of a Security Sector Transformation Office (SSTO) is proposed as a key platform to initiate, plan, coordinate, and develop international SSR-related activities.

21 SSR Goals and Assessment Criteria

Assessing the outcome of security sector reforms is notoriously difficult, because there is no common understanding and no agreed-upon definitions for the subject.¹¹ Based on the considerations presented in section 1, I propose to focus security sector reform assessments on three dimensions: democratic governance, capability provision, and co-operability. Table 1 summarizes a first set of questions that could be used to assess the transformation of the security sector.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Democratic governance is the core of SSR activities.¹² It remains important, but the scope of activities needs to be expanded in three ways: First, the more structural debate about delineating rights and duties of the security sector actors and their political oversight bodies must be complemented by a focus on the organizations' managerial capabilities. This demand puts a primary focus on the use of strategic management approaches and tools in security sector organizations. Even in properly established democracies the effective and efficient use of scarce resources by security sector actors can be improved substantially through implementing instruments like:

- Strategic planning and development at the corporate level of the respective organizations
- Management by objective with clear-cut criteria for defining short, medium, and long-term performance and financial goals
- Strategic controlling and reporting processes, e.g., based on organization-specific application of the balanced scorecard logic
- Risk and opportunity management systems that serve as early warning tools and facilitate inter alia the management of long-term projects (e.g., by assessing the risks and opportunities of each project against a set of clearly defined criteria).

¹¹ Germann, Evaluation of Security Sector Reform and Criteria of Success: Practical Needs and Methodological Problems.

¹² Improving the democratic governance of the security sector is a societal challenge that requires reformers to take into account the specific cultural, political, and institutional conditions of a country. There are still many patrimonial states in which the privatization of security and the particular interests of certain actors that run counter to such principles as transparency, accountability and rule of law are key obstacles to reform of the security sector. Despite the necessity to implement the advanced agenda proposed in this paper, the establishment of rules for the democratic governance of the security sector remains of paramount importance in most countries at the borders and outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

Second, security sector organizations and their political watchdogs must put more emphasis on continuous development rather than "reform big bangs." Formal defense or security reviews that take place every couple of years have the advantage of reinvigorating the system once they take place. However, they come with the serious downside effects of binding a lot of resources and of being rather sticky and thus not flexible enough to cope with events that occur between two reform cycles.¹³ Instead, SSR programs and activities should put more emphasis on establishing a regular strategic planning and review process that cuts across organizations and includes all security sector actors, parliamentary watchdogs, if available the nation's joint security committee, and external stakeholders.

Finally, managing relations with the civil society as well as domestic and international non-governmental organizations will become a key challenge for all security sector actors in the future. The security sector needs to interact closely with these groups in order to guarantee the necessary public support for activities at home and abroad, safeguard the needed public means, and attract the required workforce to staff the organizations. Therefore, security sector actors require a strategic stakeholder policy that defines the society's most important key representatives and defines the goals of cooperation and the ways and means of interaction.¹⁴

CAPABILITY PROVISION

Capability has become the buzzword of military force planners in the Euro-Atlantic area. Given the transnational nature of today's risks and challenges, the capability orientation should not be restricted to military forces. It must be expanded to cover all security-relevant activities. In this understanding, security sector actors will be required, among other things, to provide capabilities in:

- the more classical areas such as conventional and nuclear defense, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peace-keeping and peace enforcement,
- pre- and post-conflict areas such as preventive deployment, joint disarmament, post-conflict peace-building, and
- more domestic areas such as emergency relief, civil protection, police, border control as well as the establishment of rule of law and the building of democratic (security) institutions.

So far, the security sector reform agenda and the Euro-Atlantic area's search for capabilities have not been linked. Interlocking them needs to become a key priority for the future. Security sector reform is an inevitable building block in redesigning the national security apparatus in a way that is commensurate with the Euro-Atlantic area's

¹³ For a similar argument, see: Patrick Turner, "My Job: Policy Planning at the Ministry of Defence", *RUSI Journal*, vol. 146, no. 2 (April 2001), pp. 33-38, here p. 33.

¹⁴ James E. Post, Lee E. Preston and Sybille Sachs, "Managing the Extended Enterprise: The New Stakeholder View", *California Management Review*, vol. 45, no. 1 (Fall 2002), pp. 1-23.

security needs. Furthermore, it helps to streamline and harmonize various international activities to overcome capability shortfalls in a number of areas. To that purpose, the aspect of jointness should receive special attention when assessing the security sectors' mission and roles. Equally important is the issue of capacity building with a comprehensive view encompassing all security sector actors. Furthermore, a closer look at those capabilities that are relevant for all security sector actors is needed. These capabilities should be identified, planned, procured, and sustained jointly. Key among them will be those that support the establishment of network centric capabilities such as Command, Control, Computers, Communication (C4) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in order to frame "security space awareness" (as opposed to mere battlespace awareness); land, air and sea deployability to move security actors quickly; survivability with a special focus on Nuclear, Biological, Radiological, and Chemical (NBRC) detection, protection and decontamination, search and rescue, non-lethal weapons, and critical infrastructure protection as well as electronic warfare and information operations.

Given the trend of shrinking public budgets, security sector actors in the Euro-Atlantic area can no longer afford to identify, plan, sustain, and develop these capabilities individually. Rather they will need to join forces at national and international levels to provide these resources. In this regard security sector reformers should look at the armed forces' experience with the pooling of resources and role specialization.¹⁵ Both of these ideas provide innovative ways to approach the issue of capability provision from a top-down perspective and to use scarce resources more effectively and efficiently. Role specialization builds on the idea that different security forces dispose of comparative advantages, which should be used to advantage when setting up a division of labor among them. The pooling of resources applies a comparable logic by combining resources that are already available but which have so far been disparately organized. Over the past years, and thanks to the lift-off of the ESDP and NATO's capability initiatives, both issues have been put at the top of the agenda of Euro-Atlantic force planners. The underlying logic of these approaches could be transferred easily to all security sector actors. At present, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE are joining forces to develop a coherent approach to the border issue in the sub-region around Kosovo (see section 3). Among other things, the draft common platform proposal foresees the development of national strategies of integrated border management. This provides a good opportunity to think about how the countries of the region – with the help of the international community – could set up common border management capabilities, for instance by merging existing units, jointly pro-

¹⁵ The following two paragraphs are based on: Heiko Borchert and René Eggenberger, "ESDP, Role Specialization and Pooling of Resources: The EU's Need for Action and What It Means for Switzerland" (forthcoming); Heiko Borchert and Daniel Maurer, "Einer für alle, alle für einen". Szenarien zur Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) und ihre Bedeutung für die allianzfreien Kleinstaaten in Europa, in Gustav Gusenau (ed.), Sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungsszenarien und Trendanalysen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming).

curing the necessary surveillance systems, and agreeing on a division of labor to provide training facilities and training curricula for border control forces.

Whether or not a country decides on role specialization and/or the pooling of resources is a matter of political ambition. In any case, benefiting from these approaches demands sophisticated reforms of national planning processes, the introduction of new assessment criteria and calculation methods to evaluate the contribution of each security sector actor, and other things. SSR activities can make a valuable contribution by taking these challenges into account and by helping to redesign national security actors accordingly.

CO-OPERABILITY

Not least since September 11 it has become obvious that security sector actors need to cooperate more closely in order to provide security at the national and at the international level. Future activities will thus focus on the provision of network-centric capabilities that advance cross-institutional cooperation.¹⁶ That said, co-operability denotes the capability of all security sector actors to function together more or less seamlessly as an "integrated actor."¹⁷ In order to become co-operable, the security sector needs policy guidelines that are drawn up with a holistic perspective, planning and development processes that cut across individual organizations, and joint standards.¹⁸

Most countries in the Euro-Atlantic area have a joint security committee at the top level of the national government. These joint committees can greatly facilitate the framing of a common understanding of security risks and challenges among the representatives of the security sector. In some cases, the committees are also involved in setting up joint policy guidelines for the security sector. However, many of these joint guidelines remain ineffective in practice, because the organizational autonomy of the different security sector organizations remains untouched. Almost all countries have an urgent need to identify, establish, implement, and review planning and development processes that cut across bureaucratic boundaries. The rationale behind this demand was amply illustrated by the failure of most intelligence organizations to anticipate the events of September 11. Whether the U.S. administration's decision to establish a Department of Homeland Security by launching one of the country's most demanding organizational reforms was correct, remains to be seen. In any case, it

¹⁶ This plea builds on the idea of network-centric warfare and transfers the underlying logic of unleashing the potential of information superiority and cooperation across organizations to the security sector as a whole.

¹⁷ I borrow the term cooperability in a slightly modified form a recent study by David Gompert and Uwe Nerlich, who introduced it as a description of the ability of U.S. and European military forces to cooperate in expeditionary warfare. See: David C. Gompert and Uwe Nerlich, *Shoulder to Shoulder. The Road to U.S.-European Military Cooperability. A German-American Analysis* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2002), p. 1.

¹⁸ It should be pointed out that the improvement of the security sector's co-operability needs to be harmonized with the transformation of the defense industry, which provides most of today's capabilities needed to address security challenges.

underlines the need to push back the autonomy of individual security sector organizations in order to increase joint action.¹⁹

The success of all reform projects that aim at increasing security sector co-operability depends on three aspects: First, the ability and the willingness of the government and the parliament to redesign processes for financial budget allocation and to staff the organizations according to new priorities is key.²⁰ Second, in order to successfully realign strategic priorities intelligence reforms, mutual intelligence sharing and regional intelligence standards are very important. Without a shared perspective of the strategic risks and opportunities it will be impossible to achieve a shared strategy for achieving mutual security and cooperation among security forces. Absent a shared strategy, it is impossible to optimize funds, forces and capabilities.²¹ Finally, co-operability depends on a set of common standards for processes, structures, and material. Here the security sector as a whole can benefit from decade-long endeavors to achieve standardization among NATO countries and armed forces. Again, what is needed is an integrated approach to define the necessary standards to achieve co-operability among domestic security sector actors and their ability to cooperate with international bodies. Finally, joint training and exercises are needed to test the working of joint doctrines and standards in practice.

Assessment dimensions	Assessment questions could be
Democratic governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Security sector guidelines and goals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>General security policy document/guidelines</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does an overall document or guidelines on the country's security policy exist? - Who is involved in preparing the report/guidelines? - What is the role of the parliament in setting-up and developing the general document/guidelines? - Do these general documents stipulate the role of each security sector actor clearly? - <i>Security policy goals</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is the process to define security policy goals, and who is involved? - Who makes sure that the goals mirror the country's general security policy guidelines? - Who implements the laws? What is the level of implementation? - <i>Oversight competencies</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does the parliament receive all financial and budgetary information from the security sector actors in due time? - Does the parliament execute its authorizing competency properly? - Is the parliament regularly informed about what is going on in the different security sector organizations?

¹⁹ Ashton B. Carter, "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism", *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 5-23; Steven A. Cambone, *A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

²⁰ However, this argument should not be interpreted as a carte blanche for budget increases. Instead, it requires politicians to come to terms with the definition of security goals to be accomplished and to use scarce resources more efficiently and effectively.

²¹ I thank Robert D. Steele for addressing my attention to this point.

Assessment dimensions	Assessment questions could be
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does the parliament have access to all security sector actors? - Who decides about the deployment of security sector actors and what criteria are used? - In the case of federal states, what security sector actors and security sector activities fall into the confines of the federal entities (e.g., states, cantons, Länder) etc.?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Security sector expertise</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does the parliament have the necessary security sector-relevant expertise either through its members or on its staff? - Can the parliament contract external expertise to discuss, assess, overview, and develop security sector-relevant issues?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Security sector legislation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How does the country make sure that security sector legislation complies with national law and international humanitarian law? - How does the country ensure that security sector personnel are aware that they are individually accountable for their actions under national and international law? - How does the country make sure that the basic rights of security sector members are respected?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Security sector management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Security sector leadership</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is the civilian leadership committed to "management by objectives"? - Does the civilian leadership emphasize the application of management systems and process orientation? - Are relevant security sector processes and the respective responsibilities defined? - Is the security sector organization commensurate with the tasks? - <i>Security sector resources</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are the security sector actors' resources commensurate with their tasks? - What is the ratio of overall security sector spending compared to the government's total budget and the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)? - What is the ratio of expenditure among investments, research & development costs, maintenance costs, and personnel costs (a) in general and (b) for each security sector organization? - <i>Security sector performance</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How is the performance of security sector actors measured? - Who is in charge of performance measurement? - What performance measurement criteria are used? - How are international convergence criteria taken into account? - <i>Security sector development</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Who is in charge of monitoring the adequacy of existing security sector guidelines and legislation in view of the broader security situation and relevant development trends? - Who is in charge of adapting existing security sector guidelines and legislation? - What is the review and development process, and who is involved? - Is there regular exchange between the security sector actors (ministries and organizations) and the parliament with regard to further developing security sector-relevant guidelines and legislation?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Role of the civil society <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Who are the civil society's main stakeholders relevant for security sector affairs? - How do the security sector actors make sure that the civil society is consulted on a regular basis on security sector-relevant issues

Assessment dimensions	Assessment questions could be
Capability provision	<p>(e.g., policies, resource allocation)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What principles guide the security sector actors' stakeholder management and who – within each security sector organization – is responsible for it? - What is the role of the media in monitoring the security sector? <hr/> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Security sector description (quantitative aspects) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is the size of the different security sector actors (active, reserve)? - What means (financial resources, material) are at the disposal of the security sector actors? ■ Mission and roles of the security sector actors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Tasks</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the tasks of the security sector actors? - What is the process for task definition? - Are the tasks defined from (1) an integrated security sector understanding or (2) from a force-specific perspective? - Who is involved? - <i>Doctrines</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the doctrines of the security forces? - What is the process for doctrine definition and development, and who is involved? - How is "doctrinal jointness" guaranteed? - <i>Criteria for the internal and external use of security forces</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What criteria have been set up for the internal and external use of security forces? - What are the competencies of the parliament? - What are the decision-making processes for the internal and external use of security forces, and who is involved? - In what cases does the country foresee an international mandate for deploying security forces abroad? - What international mandates are foreseen (e.g., UN, OSCE, EU)? ■ Security sector capacity building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is there a regular exchange of employees among the security sector actors, and who is responsible for this? - Do the security sector actors possess clearly defined management development processes? - Are the management development processes designed across organizational boundaries? - Do the security sector actors have access to outside expertise, and is external know-how easily available? ■ Capabilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Joint capabilities</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How do the security forces contribute to the following joint capabilities? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - C4ISR - Land, air, sea deployability - Survivability - NBRC detection, protection, and decontamination - Non-lethal weapons - Search and rescue - Critical infrastructure protection - Information assurance, information operations - tbc - What is the process for defining the security forces' joint capabilities, and who is involved? - What is the process for developing the security forces' joint capabilities, and who is involved? - <i>Force-specific capabilities</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How do the security forces make sure that they can provide

Assessment dimensions	Assessment questions could be
	<p>their individual capabilities?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How does the process for defining the security forces' individual capabilities look like and who is involved? - How does the process for developing the security forces' individual capabilities look like and who is involved? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Procurement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Joint procurement</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is there a joint process for procuring joint capabilities? - How is the process defined, and who is involved? - <i>Individual procurement</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the force-specific procurement processes, and who is involved?
Co-operability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Joint security body <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does the country have a joint committee for the security sector (e.g., National Security Council, Security Committee)? - What are the tasks of the joint committee? - Who is represented in the joint committee? - What is the resource endowment of the joint committee (with regard to staffing and financial means)? - How is the joint committee involved in joint and force-specific planning and development processes? - How does the joint committee interact with international bodies (e.g., NAC, EU PSC) under regular and specific conditions (e.g., in case of emergency)? ■ Standards <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What kind of co-operability standards are defined (e.g., command and control, operations, logistics, force protection)? - What is the process for defining co-operability standards, and who is involved (e.g., security sector actors, joint security committee, parliament, external stakeholders)? - How are international standards incorporated into national standardization processes, and who is involved? ■ Planning and development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Joint planning and development</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is there a joint process for security sector concept development and experimentation (CDE)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How is the process defined and who is involved? - Is there a joint process for security sector planning and development? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How is the process defined and who is involved? - How are the parliamentary oversight bodies involved in joint security policy and security forces planning and development processes? - What are the joint planning and development cycles (e.g., harmonization with legislative cycles)? - How is interoperability with international joint planning and development for security policy and security forces guaranteed? - <i>Force-specific planning and development</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What are the force-specific planning and development processes, and who is involved? - How are the parliamentary oversight bodies involved in force-specific planning and development processes? - What are the force-specific planning and development cycles (e.g., harmonization with legislative cycles)? - How is interoperability with international joint planning and development for security policy and security forces guaranteed? ■ Training and exercises <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is there a joint training agenda for all security sector actors? - What is the process for defining the goals for joint training and exercises, and who is involved?

Assessment dimensions	Assessment questions could be
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is the process for setting up joint training curricula, and - What is the review process, and who is involved?

Table 1: SSR assessment dimensions and criteria

22 *SSR Planning and Review Process*

In reviewing the future of the Partnership for Peace, the EAPC member states agreed that there is a need to expand the scope and the contents of the program. They emphasized new tasks that go beyond the traditional responsibilities of the Ministries of Defense and envisaged issue-specific and result-oriented mechanisms for practical cooperation.²² As will be argued in the section 3, there can be no doubt that security sector reform is well qualified to enter the agenda of NATO and other European security organizations. At least as important as setting up new tasks for the international community is the need to improve the instruments and mechanisms that help to review what has been accomplished. Given the somewhat mixed experience with existing review mechanisms, the demand for an integrated SSR agenda is no small challenge. Several options are at hand.

PLANNING AND REVIEW PROCESS (PARP)

PARP is an optional, biennial process offered by NATO to partner countries. Countries wishing to participate provide information on a broad range of defense-related issues in the PARP Survey. A set of partnership goals helps to identify the measures each partner needs to undertake in order to improve his country's armed forces ability to cooperate with other armed forces of alliance members. If taken seriously, PARP is a useful mechanism to advance a country's force transformation process. As PARP builds on principles like self-differentiation and à-la-carte engagement, there is a substantial risk that countries fail to meet the objectives.²³

MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP)

The MAP is designed to assist NATO applicant countries. Guided by the principle of self-differentiation, aspiring countries submit individual annual programs outlining their activities for possible future membership by identifying their own objectives, targets and work schedules for political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal aspects. The MAP provides for concrete feedback and advice from NATO, which includes annual meetings with the applicant countries at the Council level. Most important with regard to SSR is the fact that MAP implementation is no longer a matter that concerns the ministries of foreign affairs and defense exclusively. In order to ful-

²² Consolidated Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, EAPC/PfP(PMSC)N(2002)0055-REV2, Annex 1, Para. 5.3, 5.4.

²³ NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2001), pp. 72-74.

fill the objectives, inter-ministerial meetings with the participation of other ministries have been established at the national level.²⁴

EU CAPABILITIES REVIEW MECHANISM

Based on the Helsinki Headline Goal declaration, the EU has set up an evaluation process that involves the member states, the EU Military Staff, and the EU Military Committee. The mechanism encompasses the following tasks:²⁵

- Identification of EU capability goals for military crisis management
- Under the direction of the EU Military Committee, monitoring of a "catalogue" of the necessary forces and capabilities resulting from these goals
- Identification and harmonization of national contributions in the light of the required capability
- Quantitative and qualitative review of progress towards honoring previously approved national pledges, including requirements in terms of the interoperability of forces (C3, exercises, training, equipment) and forces availability standards
- Modification of national pledges, if necessary

The EU combines its review mechanism with annual capability pledges conferences, which compare actual contributions with original pledges and report shortfalls. Although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this approach in advance, the implicit "name and shame" element is to be welcomed.

OSCE REVIEW MECHANISMS


The OSCE looks back on a long tradition of review and implementation meetings in the human dimension and in the area of arms control and military confidence- and security-building. Thanks to the Vienna Documents, which outline detailed provisions for the exchange of information, and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, transparency about military forces in Europe has increased to a level never before achieved in history.²⁶ Review instruments introduced in the OSCE range from common review conferences to inspections, overflights, and onsite inspections. Following its tradition, the OSCE participating states have agreed to introduce a new annual security review conference specifically tasked to discuss, inter alia, the implementation of OSCE commitments in combating terrorism and OSCE police-related activities.²⁷

²⁴ NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2001), pp. 65-67.

²⁵ Achievement of the Headline Goal: Review Mechanism for Military Capabilities, Appendix to Annex I to Annex VI, Presidency Report to the Nice European Council on the European Security and Defence Policy, SN 400/00, 7-9 December 2000. Reprinted in Ruuten, From St-Malo to Nice, pp. 183 f.

²⁶ Ernst-Otto Czempel, "Zehn Jahre Verifikation – Entwicklungen und Perspektiven", in Institut für Friedensforschung Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg/IFSH (Hrsg.), OSZE-Jahrbuch 2002 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), pp. 307-320, here p. 318.

²⁷ Decision No. 3 Annual Security Review Conference, Porto Ministerial Council, MC(10).DEC/3, 7 December 2002.



*) Intl. Assessment Authority could be NATO, the EU, the OSCE or a new joint committee/body.

Figure 2: Security Sector Reform Assessment Process

Against this background, Figure 2 illustrates a possible SSR assessment process that tries to incorporate the most important elements of existing review mechanisms: First, it builds on the well-established practice of close interaction between countries willing to reform their security sector and international organizations offering assistance. Second, the process adapts the logic of PARP and MAP by combining self-assessment elements with international peer review by joint teams consisting of experts from all SSR-relevant international organizations. Third, it will be essential to increase the international community's leverage in getting countries to achieve the necessary SSR goals. Although the principle of self-differentiation will remain important to tailor reform activities to local needs and to induce local ownership, a certain degree of conditionality is necessary.²⁸ In the long term, accession to the EU and

²⁸ See also: Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 65 f.

NATO can serve as important reform drivers. In the short term, however, SSR will prove more demanding than the reform of single security sector organizations. In this regard, the EU approach of "naming and shaming" should be applied when discussing SSR progress or failure. To that purpose it will be crucial to learn from the OSCE's culture of cooperative security by building on dialogue and cooperation even in those cases where coercion might – at least at first sight – seem more appropriate. Finally, the MAP approach of establishing inter-ministerial meetings at the national level is a prerequisite for successful SSR. It is important to keep in mind, however, that this approach might lead to outcomes that can be detrimental to the interests of certain actors. Adequate provisions for dealing with this problem will thus be needed (e.g., chairing the inter-ministerial meeting by the prime minister or the head of government).

23 SSR Work Program and Action Plan

One of the main assets of the PfP initiative is the Partnership Work Program (PWP). The PWP encompasses various activities that help countries achieve those goals that they have singled-out from the catalogue of Partnership Goals. The same logic should be applied in order to advance SSR by launching a Security Sector Work Program. Based on the SSR goals and assessment questions outlined in section 21, the SSR Work Program would contain activities to further democratic governance, to strengthen the provision of relevant security capabilities, and to advance and deepen co-operability among security sector actors. The SSR Work Program should be open to contributions from participating states, international organizations, private military and security companies, academic institutions, and non-governmental actors involved in SSR.

The idea of an SSR Work Program has been taken up by NATO's international staff as part of a comprehensive Food-for-Thought Paper to launch a "Partnership Action Plan on Security Sector Reform." The paper encompasses a range of different activities (Table 2) that fall into five broad categories.²⁹

1. General exchange of thoughts and experiences on SSR
2. Concrete activities and instruments to assist countries on SSR
3. Capacity-building, training, and education of security sector actors
4. Establishment of international structures to assist SSR activities
5. Development of inter-institutional cooperation on SSR

Unlike the original NATO paper, Table 2 below, which summarizes the main activities suggested in the Food-for-Thought Paper, is more open with regard to the international organizations to be included in SSR. As will be argued in section 3, SSR is a

²⁹ Categorization by the author.

task that should leverage the full potential of Europe's interlocking institutions. To that purpose, reference to NATO and EAPC/PfP only have been omitted from the following table in order to present the basic activities in a "neutralized" way. Additional activities have been added and are marked with an asterisk.

Category	Activities
General exchange of thoughts and experiences on SSR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organize ad hoc meetings of ministers of relevant SSR components of countries (i.e., joint sessions of the Ministers of Interior and Defense) to discuss problems that relate to security sector reform - Conduct roundtables and expert discussions on intelligence reforms - Organize SSR parliamentary roundtables to focus on the parliament's role in SSR - Organize staff talks, conferences, symposia, seminars, and workshops on SSR - Exchange key documents on missions, doctrines, processes and structures of security sector actors (similar to the OSCE's Vienna Documents)* - Organize lessons learned workshops that focus on general lessons from security sector reforms and specific issues (i.e., reforming border management, reforming specific security actor's organizations)*
Concrete activities and instruments to assist countries on SSR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduce SSR Survey to encourage countries to present their practical problems, assess their specific situation, and define clear reform objectives - Assist nations in creating or strengthening specialized units of relevant services of the SSR components - Provide civilian and military advisers to countries' governments to advise on reforms - Provide assistance with the conversion of military bases for civilian use and reintegration programs for demobilized personnel of Armed Forces and other components of security sector - Share expertise in the area of disarmament - Provide assistance in developing domestic civil society expertise and oversight capacity in security sector issues
Capacity-building, education and training of security sector actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Launch exercises to focus on joint training of the various components of the security sector with a special focus on interaction between the military and security forces - Offer special programs for career development of civilian cadres with a key focus on defense and security management - Harmonize curricula of national training and education programs for security sector components* - Identify possible lead nations to advance the joint training of security sector components* - Identify resources for training and education that could be pooled among countries interested in SSR*
Establishment of international structures to assist SSR activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish a Security Sector Transformation Office as the key platform to coordinate SSR-related activities* - Set up Advisory Boards to harmonize reform plans for individual security sector components and services - Establish Expert Advisory Teams to provide needs assessment, expertise, and "on-site" training in SSR - Review the PfP Trust Fund policy to include consequences of a broad SSR and relevant adaptation of clearing-house arrangements - Establish an SSR Policy Advisory Board composed of national experts that regularly advise the secretary general of the international organizations involved in SSR-related aspects - Open the NATO Defense College and the institutions participating in the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes to representatives of all components of the security sector

Category	Activities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Launch an SSR Website to provide SSR-related material and knowledge - Initiate research on SSR requirements
Development of inter-institutional cooperation on SSR*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identify common SSR-related activities among NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, and international financial institutions* - Analyze potentially beneficial contributions by NGOs and Private Military Companies (PMC)* - Set up an inter-institutional SSR Working Group to exchange information and to coordinate activities* - Harmonize SSR-related offers of each international organizations by setting up a joint Partnership Working Program on SSR* - Frame a common understanding of SSR challenges among the international organizations by exchanging experts and launching joint training and exercises*

Table 2: Elements of an SSR Action Plan

Note: The headings in the first column and activities with an asterisk (*) denote suggestions by the author that complement NATO's Food-for-Thought Paper on SSR

3 Interlocking Institutions and Security Sector Reform

As argued above, SSR should be interpreted as a task best dealt with in Europe's interlocking institutional framework. The way to achieve this has been paved by the close cooperation among NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, under the umbrella of the Stability Pact, to develop a coherent approach to the border issue in the Western Balkans in general and the sub-region around Kosovo in particular. To that purpose, these organizations have agreed on common political goals, common objectives, principles, and instruments, to which the countries in the Western Balkans subscribed at the recent Ohrid regional conference on border security and management on 22/23 May 2003.³⁰ This is a promising example of inter-institutional cooperation that should kick off closer interaction with regard to SSR.

Within their respective areas, all of Europe's security organizations and the United Nations can bring valuable assets and experiences to the table that should be woven into the SSR action plan suggested in the preceding section.³¹ The UN together with its special organizations is an experienced player in post-conflict peace building, disarmament, and reintegration of former members of the armed forces. With its focus on such pressing issues as smuggling, illicit trafficking of human beings, and crime prevention, the UN is well prepared to integrate SSR into the broad international context. The same can be said about the know-how of the OSCE. Its code of conduct on politico-military affairs of security³² already serves as a key reference document for the democratic governance of security sector actors. Long-standing activities in the

³⁰ Common Platform of the Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, Ohrid, 22/23 May 2003 <<http://www.stabilitypact.org/ohridindex.htm>> (accessed 27 May 2003).

³¹ See also: Chanaa, Security Sector Reform, pp. 16-24.

³² For more on this see the 1994 OSCE Code of Conduct for Politico-Military Aspects of Security whose adoption has led to a systematic exchange of information on reform progress <<http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/buda94e.pdf>> (accessed 9 June 2003).

areas of establishing democratic institutions, confidence- and security-building, arms control (including the proliferation of small arms and light weapons), police training, and education round off the profile of the Vienna-based organization. In addition, the OSCE's long-term missions and other field activities provide the international community with important tools of on-site presence that can be used to monitor the implementation of SSR. The EU's qualifications for SSR have already been pointed out with reference to the launch of the ESDP based on a balanced mix of military and non-military capabilities. Furthermore, a Common Foreign and Security Policy declaration issued in 2001 outlines the Commission's activities in the fields of police, conversion, disarmament, and non-proliferation.³³ Together with the Council of Europe, the EU and the OSCE are also active in strengthening the rule of law, a bedrock principle of successful SSR. Finally, NATO approaches SSR with invaluable experience in force planning and force transformation in a democratic set-up and all the relevant activities such as defense transparency, defense programming and budgeting, and more.

	Strengths	Weaknesses
NATO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-standing experience of assessing and developing military capabilities • Institutions (e.g., SHAPE), processes, and instruments in place • EAPC countries familiar with the relevant procedures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus restricted to military forces • Almost no carrots (incentives) at hand to stimulate reform
EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive security policy approach • Issue-linkage with prospects for European integration • Carrots to stimulate reform (e.g., cohesion fund, PHARE, TACIS) • Non-aligned and neutral countries could be easily engaged • SSR can be linked with Home and Justice Affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processes and instruments for assessment need to be established • Competencies for assessment need to be defined (who should be in charge)? • Only minor experience with exchanging sensitive and security-related data
OSCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive security policy approach • Coverage of all relevant states in the Northern hemisphere (all hot spots) • Long-standing assessment experience in the military sector (CSBMs) and in the exchange of military information (VD 99 principles) • Annual Security Review Conference could be used to discuss SSR issues • OSCE field missions could be used as antennas to monitor reform and as a backbone for int. assessment teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of political will on part of the participating states • Almost no carrots at hand to stimulate reform

Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of international organizations to deal with SSR

³³ European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM(2001)211 final, Brussels, 11 April 2001 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/comm2001_211_en.pdf> (accessed 19 April 2003). For a more detailed background analysis see: Malcolm Chalmers, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective (London: Saferworld, 2000) <<http://www.saferworld.org.uk/pubsecu.htm>> (accessed: 19 April 2003).

Setting up an SSR agenda for the Euro-Atlantic area that builds on close interaction among NATO, the EU, and the OSCE requires us to take a closer look at the individual strengths and weaknesses of these organizations, as outlined in Table 3. Taking into account both this analysis and the suggestion of NATO's international staff to set up an expert group on SSR, I propose the establishment of a Security Sector Transformation Office (SSTO) to serve as the key platform to initiate, plan, coordinate, and develop all SSR-related activities in the Euro-Atlantic area. As in the case of NATO's new command post for transformation (SAC(T)),³⁴ the SSTO would be given the primary task of enabling security sector transformation at the national and international level. In this function it would not only aid the establishment of a long-awaited transformation mechanism for non-military security tasks, but also help to bridge the gap between military and non-military security sector actors.³⁵ Therefore, the SSTO should be responsible for the following activities:

- Help to identify, provide, sustain, and develop security capabilities commensurate with the latest (and the upcoming) security trends
- Support SSR by establishing a common assessment and development framework, identifying best practice and exchanging lessons learned
- Provide peer review by conducting SSR assessments
- Serve as a clearinghouse and initiator of training and doctrine activities for security actors (with a special focus on joint training involving security forces, representatives of international organizations, and non-governmental actors)
- Help to establish joint standards for security sector actors
- Help to establish procedures for joint intelligence cooperation across the whole spectrum of security-related activities (with a special focus on systematically leveraging the benefits of open source intelligence)

Whatever the final institutional setting of the SSTO, it will be important to design it as a hybrid institution. This means three things:

- DIMENSIONS: The SSTO needs to close the gap between military and other security forces on all relevant aspects (e.g., doctrine, planning, recruitment and procurement, training and exercises, deployment, maintenance and disposal of material and systems, management development and corporate development). It could thus provide a "Euro-Atlantic hub" for various transformation activities and processes already established at national and international levels.

³⁴ The new SAC(T) will be situated with the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which is also responsible for U.S. force transformation. For a description of the USJFCOM's tasks, see: <<http://www.jfcom.mil/index.htm>> (accessed 26 March 2003).

³⁵ While USJFCOM and SAC(T) will work closely under the new NATO command structure, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the respective organizations in Europe could be brought together under the umbrella of the SSTO to initiate a similar transformation process for non-military tasks.

- **ACTORS:** The SSTO needs to be composed of representatives of all SSR-relevant international organizations or maintain direct links with those that are not involved via their own experts. Table 4 illustrates that the principle of lead agencies could be favorable to the division of labor among the organizations involved. Most important, however, is the fact that SSTO will have to follow an integrated approach to all SSR activities. To this end, the SSTO should also open its door to non-governmental actors, academic institutions, and private military and security organizations that can make valuable contributions to advance SSR.
- **PURPOSE/ROLE:** The SSTO will at the same time act as an initiator of SSR-related activities, as a consultant for countries and other international organizations, and as an auditor of what has been accomplished.

SSR Activities	International Organizations involved				
	UN	OSCE	CoE	EU	NATO
Norm-setting					
Political	Contribution	Lead	Contribution	Lead	Contribution
Technical	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Lead
Planning	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Lead
Assessment (Review)	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Lead
Assistance					
Technical	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Lead
Training/Exercises	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Lead
Political	Contribution	Lead	Contribution	Lead	Contribution
Economic	Contribution	Contribution	Contribution	Lead	Contribution

Table 4: International Organizations' contributions to SSR in the Euro-Atlantic area

Although there may be initial resistance to this proposal for setting up a new body, it is important to take into account that all the organizations mentioned have already embarked on their own SSR agendas and have committed personnel and financial resources to implement their ideas. Despite the promising cooperation in preparation for the Ohrid conference, there is an obvious risk of institutional rivalry, duplication, and lack of efficiency and effectiveness. By contrast, the SSTO would build on the idea of pooling resources and making use of existing organizations based on their respective core competencies. Experts could be assembled in a – more or less – virtual SSTO and thus benefit from working together and from keeping in close touch with their original organizations. In order to facilitate concerted actions, the SSTO could thus start as permanent working group with a "light" institutional structure. In the long run and depending on the outcome and the impact of the activities, the working group could be transformed into a fully fledged transformation office.

From an organizational perspective, the diverse staffing of the SSTO team and the organization of its work against the background of an integrated SSR agenda are more important than the question of the SSTO's institutional embeddedness.³⁶ In this regard, at least two options seem feasible: First, and taking a more short-term per-

³⁶ However, the symbolic importance that attaches to the decision of where to establish the SSTO should not be underestimated.

spective on achieving measurable outcomes, the SSTO could be established within the framework of NATO. This option helps to fully leverage existing knowledge on force planning and force transformation and to adapt it to security sector needs. Second, and taking a more long-term perspective, it might be useful to merge the SSTO with the existing EU Military Staff, thus providing the Union with an integrated security staff.³⁷ In both cases, the new staff would comprehensively cover military and non-military aspects for planning, transforming and developing security forces.

4 Conclusions

This paper's proposal for establishing a comprehensive Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI) starts from the assumption that a third generation of SSR activities is needed. By emphasizing the need for democratic governance and increasing efficiency and effectiveness of the security sector actors, the former two generations have paved the ground. What is needed now is a new boost in two directions. First, Europe's search for adequate security capabilities that span the whole spectrum of security-related activities must be taken into account more properly. Second, stronger emphasis on co-operability, i.e., the ability of all security sector actors to interact as a "singular security force," is required.

Therefore, the SSRI advanced in this paper identifies a set of reform goals and assessment questions, suggests a comprehensive SSR planning and review process that builds on existing mechanisms introduced by NATO, the EU and the OSCE, and advances the idea of setting up an SSR Work Program and Action Plan. These proposals build on the Euro-Atlantic area's interest in role specialization and the pooling of resources to advance the search for capabilities and argue that both ideas should be taken into account when reforming national security sectors. The paper concludes by advocating that Europe's security organizations can make valuable contributions to advance SSR and thus favors an interlocking approach that builds on each organization's core competency. In particular, it is argued that a Security Sector Transformation Office should be established as the key platform to coordinate all SSR activities by pooling the resources and the know-how of these organizations. Implementing the paper's proposals will help to establish a common understanding of the security challenges and how to address them, thereby breathing life into the long-awaited Euro-Atlantic *acquis communautaire* for security affairs.

³⁷ For a similar proposal see: Hans-Christian Hagman, *European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 99.