

Published in: Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (ed.), *Small States and Alliances* (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2001, pp. 161-182).

Heiko Borchert

Switzerland and Europe's Security Architecture: The Rocky Road from Isolation to Cooperation*

Located in the heart of Europe, Switzerland has traditionally pursued a security policy based on the idea that the country is surrounded by enemies instead of by friends. Until the early nineties, Army planners and security experts adhered to Mearsheimer's "back to the future" scenario and prepared for a European continent falling apart. Now, at the end of the century, we know that things look brighter. The magistrates in Bern realize that they are losing ground, especially with respect to the former Communist countries now eagerly applying for membership in the European Union (EU) and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They risk being caught in what can be called the *neutrality trap*: Because of the favorable European security environment the political elite is not willing to discuss the use of neutrality in post-Cold War Europe. But it is exactly the lack of that discussion that makes it impossible for Switzerland to fully benefit from the favorable environment. The outcome is a dilemma: NATO membership is possible, but not desirable. EU membership is desirable, but not possible.

In what follows I will look more closely at Switzerland's relationship with Europe's security architecture. I address first the most recent developments at the European level and argue that these changes narrow Switzerland's foreign and security policy options. I then turn to Switzerland's latest security policy report calling for "security through cooperation". Although the report sketches a good and sometimes brave vision the proof – as always – lies in the eating. I will address some problems the government will face when implementing its latest report. Finally, I will turn to Switzerland's Kosovo performance, which was the first test for the new security policy. I will show that the results are mixed and that a lot remains to be done until all ministries act in accordance either with the security report mentioned or with the foreign policy report issued back in 1993 – indeed a rocky road from isolation to cooperation!

1 Europe's Security Architecture: Sharpening contours

The experience of the past few years permits us to form a more concrete picture of how Europe's security architecture will look in the next century. The most important steps include the opening of NATO through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the signing of political charters with Russia and Ukraine, the entry of three new members, the Alliance-led military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the decision to enlarge the EU. Most recently these also embrace the rapprochement between NATO and the EU, the latter's decision to in-

* I thank Jürg Martin Gabriel for stimulating discussions and helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper.

tegrate the Western European Union (WEU) and to be more actively involved in the so called Petersberg tasks, and – finally – the agreement to create a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice by integrating the Schengen and Dublin agreements into community law.

From a more theoretical point of view Europe's security architecture can be said to rest on three dimensions and five principles. The three dimensions are: military security, economic security, and political-legal security. The principles include: multilateralism, democratic peace, institutions, leadership, and supranational integration.¹ Let me start with the five principles and then turn to the three dimensions.

1. Multilateralism: Europe's security architecture is multilateral in character, i.e. it is build on a set of rules facilitating and strengthening cooperation. Multilateralism implies equal treatment of all actors (indivisibility) and the general applicability (non-discrimination) of liberal norms. Actors therefore develop positive expectations favoring international cooperation and allowing them to overcome the security dilemma.² However, multilateralism has two Achilles heels: expected benefits and the behavior of the actors. When cooperating states will form what Keohane called "expectations of diffuse reciprocity".³ States may expect to benefit from international cooperation over time and are prepared to make concessions today, anticipating the benefits of cooperation to outweigh concessions to other states. Such an approach may pose great risks if governments cannot expect others to play by the rules (security dilemma). There is thus a tendency to defect. Safety devices are therefore needed to avoid backsliding into great power politics.

2. Democratic peace: After the end of the Cold War the theory of democratic peace has become the guiding principle for creating a common European security architecture including the Atlantic, the Western European and the former Communist countries. Building a security community does not only require "the realization of sufficient commonality of security interests" and "a substantial transformation of the security dilemma", it also involves "the disappearance of the traditional security dilemma among a select group of states".⁴ The disappearance of the traditional security dilemma has much to do with the foreign policy of the states involved. It is of paramount importance whether these states show a high or low propensity for war fighting, and whether the likelihood of war in the international system is seen to be high or low. Democratic norms and structures reduce the probability of war between states.⁵ Therefore the theory of democratic peace can be interpreted as the first safety device to avoid the relapse into war in Europe.

¹ Heiko Borchert, *Europas Sicherheitsarchitektur: Erfolgsfaktoren – Bestandsaufnahme – Handlungsbedarf* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 71-152.

² John Gerard Ruggie, *Winning the Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 20; John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution", in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.14-22.

³ Quoted in Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution", p. 11.

⁴ Brian L. Job, "Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management", in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 177.

⁵ Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs", *PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS*, 80:4 (1982), pp. 205-235; Colin H. Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace", *SECURITY STUDIES*, 8:2/3 (1999), pp. 94-144; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

3. Institutions: In a multilateral order actors develop common norms, follow them and foresee enforcement procedures in case of deviation. This implies the existence of institutions ? understood as durable patterns of behavior based on norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures ? ultimately based on a democratic and liberal worldview.⁶ During the last fifty years, European countries, with the help of their transatlantic allies, have woven a tight web of international organizations, regimes, politically and legally binding international agreements, and common norms and principles serving as the backbone of Europe's security architecture. Because institutions "make certain things easier to do and other things harder to do"⁷ they help to overcome international anarchy. They can be regarded as the second safety device avoiding Mearsheimer's scenario.

4. Leadership: Despite its advantages a multilateral system tends to show signs of institutional inertia, buck passing, and inactivity ? tendencies that undermine the credibility of the system. Therefore a multilateral system cannot do without leadership, the third safety device, that helps to remedy such situations. However, in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, where material resources play a crucial role, recent studies have emphasized the importance of norms in persuading followers and the role of non-hegemonic states that can develop true leadership.⁸

5. Supranational integration: A distinctly European experience remains to be mentioned: supranational integration. This phenomenon can be understood as a process whereby governments act jointly and freely to create international bodies by transferring sovereignty, thus granting them executive power. Within such a framework governments not only coordinate their policies but also initiate common policies binding on member states. Such a supranational body can act independently and its norms are directly applicable thereby enjoying precedence over national law. Hence, supranational integration as the forth safety device helps to prevent the renationalization of international politics.⁹

Let me now turn to the relationship between the five principles just mentioned and the military, the economic and the political-legal dimensions of Europe's security architecture. Here, two aspects must be highlighted: First, and most important, Europe's security organizations tend to work on the basis of identical core values. At the national level the democracy requirement (adhering to the rule of law, separating powers, free elections and guaranteeing human rights) has become the rule. At the international level openness, transparency, predict-

⁶ For a general introduction see: B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science. The "New Institutionalisms"* (London, New York: Pinter, 1999).

⁷ Robert E. Goodin, "Institutions and Their Design", in Robert E. Goodin (ed.), *The Theory of Institutional Design* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 16.

⁸ Jarrod Wiener, "'Hegemonic' Leadership. Naked Emperor or the Worship of False Gods?", *EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, 1:2 (1997), pp. 219-243; Jarrod Wiener, "Leadership, the United Nations, and the New World Order", in Dimitri Bourantonis and Jarrod Wiener (eds.), *The United Nations in the New World Order: The World Organization at Fifty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 41-63; Jarrod Wiener, *Making Rules in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. A Study of International Leadership* (Aldershot; Dartmouth, 1995).

⁹ Most useful overviews of the vast literature on integration theory can be found in: Claus Giering, *Europa zwischen Zweckverband und Superstaat* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1997); Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19-40; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 18-85; Michael O'Neill, *The Politics of European Integration. A Reader* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 21-53, 122-144.

ability, reciprocity, flexibility, abstention from the use of force, sufficiency and cooperation form the constitutional norms of a multilateral security architecture for Europe in the 21st century. Second, there is a direct link between the contribution of Europe's security organizations and the dimensions analyzed. In the realm of economics the transfer of sovereignty has led to the creation of a robust supranational framework, especially in the EU. Together with transnational interest groups these supranational institutions have begun to develop a life of their own by adopting decision that heavily influence the member states' policies.¹⁰ In military matters, the aim of setting up multinational units, the required standardization of military doctrines and of equipment begin to encroach upon sovereignty. In order to keep multinational units working, governments have to agree on decisions limiting their sovereignty. In politics, most prominently in security and foreign affairs, intergovernmentalism still reigns over supranationalism. Nevertheless, the most recent developments in the Balkans have made it abundantly clear that the EU needs to reform its foreign and security policy system if it is to overcome its dependence on NATO and on US military assets. As will be shown below, these trends will heavily affect Switzerland's foreign and security policy.

Proposition 1: *The most recent developments at the European level will narrow Switzerland's options in foreign and security policy.*

Although the changes mentioned favor Switzerland's security and foreign policy interests, the outcome is ambivalent: While the country should and can benefit from these developments they will at the same time narrow the country's foreign and security policy options. It therefore becomes necessary to clarify the meaning of neutrality in post-Cold War Europe (see proposition 2).

No doubt the recent conflicts in the Balkans have heavily affected Europe's security architecture and Europe's preparedness to come to terms with its deficiencies. First, the Balkan conflicts have demonstrated what NATO will be about in post-Cold War Europe. Second, these conflicts have also shown that with the partial exception of the UK and France, European armed forces lack the necessary capabilities for crisis management.¹¹ This can be interpreted as the primary reason for the Franco-German decision to reactivate the Eurocorps and its new role as a Rapid Reaction Force.¹² In addition, the fast-track plan to integrate the WEU into the EU to strengthen the latter's military crisis management capability also originates in recent events.¹³

Third, security experts propose to learn from the Euro experience. Creating the common currency and the European Monetary Union would have been much more difficult without convergence criteria required by all countries willing to participate. The same logic could be

¹⁰ Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.), *European Integration and Supranational Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹¹ For an up-to-date assessment see: Gordon Wilson (ed.), *European force structures. Papers presented at a seminar held in Paris on 27 & 28 May 1999* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1999; Occasional Papers, no. 8).

¹² NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 31 May 1999, p. 3.

¹³ Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, SN 150/99, 3/4 June 1999, Annex III: European Declaration on Strengthening Common European Policy on Security and Defence, pp. 33-42; Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Summit, SN 300/99, 10/11 December 1999, Paras. 25-28 and Annex IV: Presidency reports on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence and on non-military crisis management of the European Union.

applied to European military cooperation and the following criteria could be used as benchmarks: Spending on procurement and R & D, the level of military manpower as a percentage of the population, defense spending per person, and the percentage of a country's armed forces ready for deployment outside the NATO area.¹⁴ These criteria could be monitored by a peer group. As in the business world where benchmarking has become a standard instrument for improving production processes and services, the application of defense convergence criteria could lead to similar processes in military recruitment and procurement, strategic planning and defense industry cooperation. First signs of positive side effects are already visible in the growing consolidation of the European aerospace industry.¹⁵ At the beginning of 1999, British Aerospace acquired Marconi Electronic Systems, the General Electric Company's manufacturer of defense components. In Autumn 1999, the French Aerospatiale Matra SA and the German-American Daimler Chrysler Aerospace AG (DASA) decided to form the new European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company (EADS), which was later joined by the Spanish air craft manufacturer CASA.¹⁶ These developments also benefit from the growing involvement of the European Commission in the harmonizing of Europe's defense industries.¹⁷

Finally, the ties between EU and NATO are getting closer, with NATO granting the EU access to its military capabilities.¹⁸ It has been proposed in EU discussions that the position of the EU-neutrals will not formally be changed by the WEU's integration into the EU. However, it is quite clear that it will become more and more difficult to stay apart in core questions of European defense and security policy. EU and NATO membership are still two different things but there will be growing political pressure from the EU to reduce differences in membership. This is due to the fact that the application of article V of the WEU treaty remains restricted to NATO members of EU. The faster the Union is expanding eastwards and the longer it takes to build up the necessary military capabilities the greater will be the danger of so called "back door" security guarantees for the new members, something Washington is unwilling to give.

The consequences are obvious. On the one hand these changes will strengthen NATO by making it more flexible for European operations without the participation of US armed forces

¹⁴ Charles Grant, *European defence post-Kosovo?* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999). The idea of defense convergence criteria was first proposed by François Heisbourg in the June/July edition of the Centre for European Reform Bulletin (http://www.cer.org.uk/news/n_6_1.htm). A similar idea was also put forward by French President Jacques Chirac in his speech before the North Atlantic Assembly on 20 October 1999. See: NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 21 October 1999, p. 5.

¹⁵ It is not surprising that a transnational merger mania is growing in the aerospace industry because the national consolidation process is much more advanced in this sector than in maritime or in armored vehicles industries.

¹⁶ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 20 January 1999, p. 19; 15 October 1999, p. 21; 3 December 1999, p. 27.

¹⁷ Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence-Related Industries, COM (97) 538 final, 12 November 1997; Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, SN 150/99, 3/4 June 1999, Annex III: European Declaration on Strengthening Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Para. 2. For an overview of what has been achieved so far see: Rudolf Agstner, "Europäische Rüstungspolitik. Drei Jahre Ad hoc-Gruppe des EU-Rates 'Europäische Rüstungspolitik' (POLRAM)", ÖSTERREICHISCHE MILITÄRISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 36:5 (1998), pp. 505-516; John Lovering, "Which Way to Turn? The European Defense Industry After the Cold War", in Ann R. Markusen and Sean S. Costigan (eds.), *Arming the Future. A Defense Industry for the 21st Century* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 334-370.

¹⁸ Washington Summit Communiqué, signed and issued by the heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999 (NAC-S(99)63), Paras. 9-10.

and by bolstering the European capability within the Alliance. On the other hand they will raise the EU's profile in military matters. Switzerland now faces two problems. First, it is not a member of these organizations. Although it may benefit from PfP, the fact that the government cannot fully participate in the decision making process of a policy area growing in importance is bad. Second, as will be shown in more detail below, the government's leeway regarding participation in international military operations and training exercises is limited.¹⁹ On the one hand this is due to the fact that the Swiss in 1994 rejected a law establishing Swiss peace-keeping forces. On the other hand this is due to the government's neutrality understanding. From the outset of its involvement in PfP the government has categorically excluded Swiss participation in defense-like military exercises. When signing the PfP Framework Document in 1996 then Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti even declared that Switzerland could (and probably also would) withdraw from PfP if the initiative took a defense-like character.²⁰ Switzerland's PfP offers therefore concentrate on courses dealing with the democratic control of armed forces, seminars in international law and the law of armed conflicts, the training for officers, diplomats and military observers, the provision of emergency and disaster medicine, the free flow of information, and the diffusion of know-how of the Army's AC Laboratory.²¹

After creating a common market and a common currency the Europeans are now ready for a common army and closer cooperation in justice and home affairs (see proposition 5). Although these developments heavily affect Switzerland, the government has almost no possibility to influence them. Despite the fact that the Cold War has ended the country's foreign and security policy options are narrowing. The government needs to join the Euro-Atlantic community and it needs to change its neutrality policy.

2 "Security through Cooperation": The new Security Policy Report

In June 1999, the Swiss government presented its new Security Policy Report. It can be seen as a revision of the report published in October 1990 (Report 90). The Report 90, which was entitled "Swiss Security Policy in Times of Change" was heavily influenced by neo-realist thinking.²² John Mearsheimer's thesis that the future of Europe lies in its past, i.e. that a return of great power politics is inevitable,²³ served as the most important of four scenarios.²⁴ As a consequence the Report 90 strongly emphasized the need to uphold Switzerland's independ-

¹⁹ A revised edition of the *Militärgesetz*, which foresees international cooperation for training purposes will be discussed by the parliament in the year 2000. It is to be expected that political right wing groups will launch a referendum that will be due in 2001.

²⁰ Andreas Wenger, Christoph Breitenmoser, and Patrick Lehmann, "Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden – eine Chance für die Schweiz", in *Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik* (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, 1997/8), p. 66.

²¹ For more information see: <http://www.pfp.ethz.ch/index.cfm>.

²² *Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel. Bericht 90 des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz*, Bern, 1 October 1990 (subsequently called Report 90).

²³ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*, 15:1 (1990), pp. 5-56.

²⁴ Report 90, pp. 30-35. The other three scenarios were entitled: (1) Relapse into old confrontations and appearance of new dangers, (2) Low-intensity warfare, (3) Increasing vulnerability of modern societies. For a detailed critique of the Report 90 see: Jürg Martin Gabriel, "Europa und die schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik", in Jürg Martin Gabriel (ed.), *Sackgasse Neutralität* (Zürich: vdf Verlag, 1997), pp. 115-128.

ence and to bolster its capacity for autonomous defense (strategy of deterrence). Hence the report's aims were defined as: (1) securing peace in freedom and independence, (2) safeguarding autonomy, (3) protecting the population, (4) guaranteeing territorial defense, and (5) supporting international stability primarily in Europe. Although the report defined four different strategies to achieve these goals, the deterrence strategy was the most important.

In parts the new Foreign Policy Report of 1993 (Report 93) began to question the principles of neutrality and sovereignty.²⁵ The Report 93 defined five aims: (1) peace and security, (2) human rights, democracy and the rule of law, (3) economic welfare, (4) social justice and (5) a healthy environment. With regard to achieving these results the report undertakes an important shift. So far neutrality had been the main instrument of Switzerland's foreign policy, and independence was the ultimate goal. The new report talks about the need of carefully balancing different ends and means. Furthermore, the report makes strong commitments in favor of acting in solidarity with the international community, in supporting international organizations, and particularly in bolstering the collective security system of the United Nations (UN) as well as regional security regimes such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU's Common Foreign Policy (CFSP). Multilateralism is given much more weight while neutrality should be used only when all other instruments fail and the international order has collapsed.²⁶ The following foreign policy options are declared compatible with Switzerland's status as a neutral country: Joining the UN and the EU, participating in the development of the Union's CFSP, joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (now called Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC) and PfP, participating in economic sanctions of the UN and the EU, participating in peacekeeping operations and granting the UN and NATO military transit rights.²⁷

After the publication of the Report 93 it became obvious that Switzerland's security policy needed revision. Parallel to the new foreign policy report the government submitted new legislation calling for the creation of Swiss peace-keeping forces. In 1993, both chambers of the parliament agreed on the draft but three small right wing parties (the *Lega dei Ticinesi*, the *Freiheitspartei*, and the *Schweizer Demokraten*) launched a referendum. At that time the UN peacekeeping activities unfortunately faced enormous problems in Somalia and in Yugoslavia. These problems backfired on those willing to change the course of Switzerland's security policy. In June 1994, the Swiss voted against a Swiss participation in UN peacekeeping activities.²⁸

The government needed time to recover. In the meantime NATO launched its PfP initiative and invited all OSCE states to enter into closer cooperation with the Alliance. Although the Swiss government welcomed this opportunity the negative vote on the Swiss peacekeeping force delayed its decision. Based on the Dayton Accord NATO organized the Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce peace in Bosnian-Herzegovina. IFOR turned out to be a suc-

²⁵ *Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren*, Bern, 29 November 1993 (subsequently called Report 93).

²⁶ Report 93, pp. 20-46.

²⁷ For a critical assessment see: Jürg Martin Gabriel, "Neutralität für den Notfall: Der Bericht des Bundesrats zur Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren", in Gabriel, *Sackgasse Neutralität*, pp. 129-158.

²⁸ For a more detailed account see: Robert Diethelm, *Die Schweiz und friedenserhaltende Operationen, 1920-1995* (Bern: Paul Haupt Verlag, 1997), pp. 266-283.

cess. As a result the government in late 1995 decided to allow NATO transports on the ground and in the air through Switzerland to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the negative vote on blue helmets, the government was not in a position to support IFOR militarily. During the Swiss OSCE Presidency in 1996 the government therefore decided to launch the unarmed Swiss Headquarters Support Unit to assist the OSCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These steps were positively received by Switzerland's political parties and the population. Almost three years after the invitation then Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti in December 1996 signed the PfP Framework Document in Brussels.²⁹ Subsequently, the government felt strong enough to launch a new round of discussions on Switzerland's new security policy.

The new Security Policy Report (Report 2000) is the preliminary result of this discussion.³⁰ The new report's title – "Security through Cooperation" – makes it clear that the old doctrine no longer applies. The new report has various origins. On the one hand it grew out of the report of a commission of experts that in 1998 published the so called *Bericht Brunner*.³¹ That report strongly argued in favor of increasing cooperation in the field of security policy. On the other hand, the *Bericht Brunner* paved the ground for the security policy guidelines the government published some months later. Most important was the following statement:

Security through Cooperation. This principle defines the direction of Switzerland's new security policy. Guaranteeing the country's security means improving the integration of different domestic security policy instruments and enhancing the cooperation with other countries and international organizations.³²

The Report 2000 is in line with most comparable reports published in recent years.³³ It states that in Europe the threat of territorial warfare has diminished sharply while new risks such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime or the violation of human rights have become increasingly important. The possibility of coping with these risks unilaterally is declining and the need to cooperate is growing. This analysis leads the Report 2000 to reconsider the strategic goals: So far, defense was the army's most important task. In the future it will only rank third, and the need to cooperate with other armed forces, especially through joint training, will increase. Preventing and managing civilian catastrophes is in second place. However, so called "subsidiary operations" of the Army to support civil authorities remain domestically contested (see proposition 4). Finally, peace support

²⁹ For a more detailed account of Switzerland's road to PfP see: Wenger/Breitenmoser/Lehmann, "Die Partnerschaft für den Frieden – eine Chance für die Schweiz", pp. 66-88.

³⁰ *Sicherheit durch Kooperation. Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz*, Bern, 7 June 1999 (subsequently called Report 2000).

³¹ *Bericht der Studienkommission für strategische Fragen*, Bern, 26 February 1998 (available online at: <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/d/armee/pub/brunn/index.htm>)

³² *Sicherheit durch Kooperation. Politische Leitlinien für den sicherheitspolitischen Bericht*, Bern, September 1998, p. 4 (own translation).

³³ *Weissbuch 1994* (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 1994); *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of the Staff, 1996); *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad. White Paper on Foreign Policy* (Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996); *Sicherheitspolitisches Umfeld und Streitkräfteentwicklung II*, (Wien: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1996); *The Strategic Defence Review* (London: The Stationery Office, 1998); *Bericht über alle weiterführenden Optionen Österreichs im Bereich der Sicherheitspolitik* (Wien, 1998).

and crisis management is the new priority. Compared to the Report 90, the armed forces must expand their involvement in hot spots.³⁴ In addition, the legal basis, the *Militärgesetz* and other laws regulating the use of armed forces, will have to be changed. The whole process of redesigning Switzerland's security policy is expected to be completed by the end of 2002.

While I completely agree with the broad outline of the new report on security policy it is quite obvious that the government will face problems with its implementation. In what follows four different topics will be addressed: The first argument is that the hottest issue – that of remaining neutral or entering NATO – has not been solved satisfactorily. Second, I show that the organizational structures of the Defense Department itself are not yet ready for the new security policy. Third, I criticize the fact that the army's domestic role has not been defined more accurately. Finally, the most important problems will be discussed: The fact that the government discovers the relevance of the EU for its own security at a time when it has become harder than ever to benefit from it.

Proposition 2: *Avoiding the discussion about "neutrality or NATO" will make things more difficult in the future.*

It surprises no expert that the government's handling of neutrality will be the ultimate test for the new security policy. In this regard the new report is ambivalent and contradictory. It is true that the Report 2000 contains some strong statements such as the following:

Neutrality becomes irrelevant in case of a direct military attack on Switzerland. In such a situation Switzerland would defend itself on its own or together with allies, depending on the strength of the attack. In view of such a contingency early preparatory measures for possible cooperation with foreign armed forces are entirely possible as long as irreversible commitments and dependence for defence are avoided.

The *feeling of security* that neutrality conveyed over a very long period of time to the Swiss population has become *deceptive*. Neutrality alone is not sufficient to guarantee the security of Switzerland especially if it is equated with abstention from international security cooperation. Furthermore, it does not provide any guidance for our policy with regard to conflicts where the law of neutrality is not applicable.³⁵

These remarks come close to a revolution in Swiss security policy. However, the report is not strict enough. If neutrality has in fact lost its value, why is every statement of security cooperation accompanied by the remark that it either does not affect neutrality or is compatible with it? And, to be more precise, if the report states that Switzerland shares with its neighbors the same opportunities and risks of the post-Cold War world what is the use of neutrality? When and toward whom does the government want to practice neutrality?

The Report 2000 is right in stating that neutrality must not become an obstacle to Switzerland's security. Even if the country complies unreservedly with the law of neutrality the report sees considerable room for maneuver. I think this is not correct. The problem the above

³⁴ Report 2000, pp. 36-39.

³⁵ Report 2000, pp. 39-40 (own translation).

questions refer to is a familiar one, and it is illustrated by the recent statement of a well known member of the Swiss parliament:

Today, NATO membership is a non-topic. Neutrality is deeply rooted in Swiss identity. Hence it would not be opportune to discuss the issue domestically. Furthermore, the country's foreign policy situation does not require such a discussion, because there is no need to question the principle of neutrality as such.³⁶

The Report 2000 contains a similar argument: In order to ensure Switzerland's security and regional stability it is not necessary to join NATO. And the government adds: 'The fact that Switzerland, as a non-member of NATO, is excluded from activities under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (collective defence) has no negative repercussions on our security, considering the nature of today's threats and dangers'.³⁷ The problem with this kind of reasoning is threefold.

First, referring to Swiss identity is a cheap excuse for not having to discuss the fact that the world changes rapidly while the Swiss behave as if no change took place. Second, the foreign policy situation does in fact require a neutrality debate. It is true that there are no longer threats comparable to the ones faced in the Cold War. However, referring to NATO simply as a defense alliance misses the point. Everyone familiar with Lord Ismay's famous statement – that the purpose of NATO is to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out – knows that the Alliance has always been a multipurpose organization. Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane recently argued that NATO is a hybrid institution, i.e. the Alliance can "deal both with security problems created by external threats or problems and those problem posed by risks, mistrust, and misunderstandings among members."³⁸ The hybrid character greatly facilitated modifications in NATO's aims and structures in the 1990s.³⁹ Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War defense is just one function of the Alliance, which has grown in *political* importance. Integration of former enemies, crisis management, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement are now the first priority. Enhanced PfP and NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP) enable armed forces to achieve interoperability and to prepare for peace support operations. But it is exactly the lack of the discussion about neutrality that hinders Switzerland to participate fully in these activities.

Third, as I argued in the first section, Switzerland's foreign and security policy options are narrowing because NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe's security architecture and also because there is a rapprochement between the EU and the Alliance. The neutral EU members will inevitably come under pressure. Consider this: In Autumn 1998 Austria for the first time held the EU Presidency. The situation in Kosovo worsened. Close contacts between the EU Presidency and NATO officials were necessary to coordinate their actions. NATO of-

³⁶ Vreny Sperry, "NATO-Beitritt der Schweiz?", ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITÄRZEITSCHRIFT, 165:4 (1999), p. 5 (own translation).

³⁷ Report 2000, p. 43.

³⁸ Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions", in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (eds.), *Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 34.

³⁹ Wallander/Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions", p. 40-46.

officials probably have confronted the Austrians with the fact that they are planning a military intervention without the consent of the UN Security Council. Is it realistic to assume that neutral Austria, without losing political credibility, could at that point have opted out and left the "hot potato" for someone else to deal with? Switzerland was facing a similar problem. During Operation Allied Force, executed without UN mandate, Switzerland like Austria denied transit rights for allied airplanes. The government referred to the law of neutrality to justify its position. It changed only after UN Security Council resolution 1244 was adopted. In such a case neutrality becomes dysfunctional and incredible because the neutrality argument was at odds with the fact that Switzerland, and Austria, both supported Operation Allied Force.⁴⁰ Since the so called "Petersberg tasks" are growing in importance such dilemmas will become the rule not the exception. The non-neutral EU/NATO countries will therefore have to find ways permitting the participation of neutrals. They must themselves decide whether and how restrictive to apply neutrality. Better for both to make up their minds now than on the eve of a new crisis.

Proposition 3: *The management structures of the Swiss Defense Department are not up to the new security policy report – they need to be totally overhauled, and the primacy of politics must be reaffirmed.*

Steven Cambone of the Washington based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has recently presented his analysis of the US national security policy planning structures. He argued that the structures are outdated and overly focused on military aspects of security.⁴¹ The same can be said about the structure of the Swiss Defense Department. Apart from the discussion about a Swiss National Security Council,⁴² there are two basic structural problems so far underestimated by the reformers.

First, in Switzerland civil-military relations have for centuries been military-civilian relations.⁴³ This fact is most prominently reflected in the management structures of the Department. The top decision making units (*Geschäftsleitung* and *Geschäftsleitungsausschuss*) are dominated by high-ranking military.⁴⁴ By contrast, New Zealand's Ministry of Defense is headed by the Secretary of Defense and an Executive Board that consists entirely of civil managers. The Commanders of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force are subordinate to the

⁴⁰ For an Austrian view see: Gustav Gusenau, "Das Neutralitätsdilemma. Die österreichische Sicht", ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITÄRZEITSCHRIFT, 165:6 (1999), p. 11; Erich Reiter, *Neutralität oder NATO. Die sicherheitspolitischen Konsequenzen aus der europäischen Aufgabe Österreichs* (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1996).

⁴¹ Steven A. Cambone, *A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning* (Westport: Praeger, 1998).

⁴² Kurt R. Spillmann, "Sicherheitspolitik ist Chefsache der Exekutive. Überlegungen zur strategischen Neuausrichtung", NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 15 March 1999, p. 11; Report 2000, pp. 67-69.

⁴³ Recently, Michael C. Desch argued that it is easiest for civilians to control the military when they face primarily international (external) threats. However, after the end of the Cold War domestic risks and threats are more likely. According to Desch this makes it more difficult to control the military. Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military. The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

⁴⁴ According to Article 3 of the *Militärorganisationsverordnung* (SR 510.21), the *Geschäftsleitung* consists of the Head of the Department, the Secretary General (both civilians), the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Army, the Commanders of the Army Corps, the Chief of the Air Force (all military), and the Chief of the Armament Unit (civilian). With the exception of the four Commanders, the same people also meet in the *Geschäftsleitungsausschuss*. The new *Geschäftsordnung* of the Defense Department, which entered into force at the end of 1999, has only marginally improved the situation.

Executive Board.⁴⁵ It comes as no surprise that the Swiss Defense Department can hardly adopt a decision that the military oppose. This poses particular problems for Switzerland's participation in PfP, which some military would still like to block. It also hinders the reform of the recruiting system and the training of soldiers.

Second, insiders have for long advocated the establishment of corporate structures at the top of the Department by dissolving the Secretariat General and reorganizing the administrative structures. This proposal takes into account the most recent security changes in Europe, which no longer require the primacy of territorial defense. It is also a consequence of the declared aim of implementing the principles of new public management and of the new Security Policy Report's plea for flexible security cooperation at home. Finally, establishing corporate structures is necessary to safeguard the Department's manageability. Ever since two new branches – sports and civil protection – were transferred to the Defense Department the latter looks like an industrial conglomerate. Because its branches have only few things in common they need to be run independently. However, without common strategic guidelines the Department's leadership will soon face chaos. That is why a small unit at the top of the Department should be responsible for corporate planning and corporate development and for adopting the Department's guidelines for finance, personnel, public relations, information technology and armament procurement.

Following the primacy of politics the establishment of corporate structures will lead to an important reallocation of resources from the General Staff to the new civilian corporate structures. Small wonder the opposition against this plan has intensified recently. But the resistance of some General Staff members is problematic for two reasons. First, this is once more proof that at the top of the Department civil-military relations do not work. Second, the process of establishing "Army XXI" is dominating the reform of the whole Department. This puts management principles on their head and endangers the effective reform of the administrative structures and the successful integration of the two new branches. While the reform process of the armed forces can and should not be stopped, the Head of the Department has to make clear that he is willing to introduce the new corporate structures thereby reaffirming the primacy of politics in military affairs.

Proposition 4: *The new security policy report missed the opportunity to clarify the Army's domestic role.*

So called "subsidiary operations" of the armed forces are politically sensitive. There is good reason to rely on the armed forces in case of emergencies caused by natural catastrophes such as floods or avalanches. However, the protection of foreign embassies in Switzerland or the surveillance and support of refugee camps is not a task that should be given to the armed forces. While it is true that such operations will have to be approved by the relevant civilian authorities,⁴⁶ there is a tendency to rely on the armed forces too quickly. Even more important, the cost of such operations conducted by the armed forces tends to be underestimated. According to General staff calculations Army operations to support and survey refugee camps

⁴⁵ For more on this see <http://www.defence.govt.nz/org/mod.htm>.

⁴⁶ Verordnung über den Truppeneinsatz für den Ordnungsdienst (SR 513.71), Verordnung über den Truppeneinsatz für den Grenzpolizeidienst (SR 513.72), Verordnung über den Truppeneinsatz zum Schutz von Personen und Sachen (SR 513.73).

could cost up to 100 million Swiss Francs (US\$ 70 million) a year.⁴⁷ To protect foreign embassies and international organizations one should either consider outsourcing, or establishing more robust police forces in the cantons, thereby following the French or Italian pattern. Concerning the Army's future role in handling refugee camps the project teams "Army XXI" and "Civil Protection" have agreed on the following: Normally, the camps will get the support of local civil authorities. If they cannot handle the demands the civil protection agencies step in. The Army will no longer be involved in these kinds of subsidiary operations.⁴⁸ This is a good solution which will hopefully have an impact on the new conceptions for the Army and the area of civil protection.

Proposition 5: *It is a bitter irony that Switzerland discovers the relevance of the EU for its own security at a time when it is harder than ever to benefit from it.*

The experts drafting the Report 2000 were heavily influenced by two most recent incidents: First, by the international debate on Switzerland's role during World War II (Holocaust debate). Second, by the growing number of refugees Switzerland received in the aftermath of the Balkan conflicts. Both events have changed the way in which the Swiss government looks at the EU. So far the EU was an economic area. Switzerland was eager to participate economically but it had great reservations with regard to the Union's political system. Nowadays, the Union is portrayed as an area of common security from which Switzerland stays apart.

According to the new security policy report the Holocaust debate was merely a prelude to the kind of political and economic pressure the country will have to cope with in the future.⁴⁹ Consequently, the Report 2000 argues that Switzerland would benefit from joining the EU. This argument is short-sighted. Since the end of World War II the official policy emphasized Switzerland's status as a neutral and non-aligned country and the expectation was that because Switzerland was neither a member of the UN, NATO or the EU the probability that she will be the target of political or economic pressure was extremely unlikely. Today, this argument is put on its head. Because Switzerland is neutral and stays out of most international organizations it is vulnerable. Joining the EU would therefore make the country more resistant against such attacks.⁵⁰ But is it realistic to believe that the European Commission or any EU member would have threatened to adopt sanctions against the United States because of the verbal attacks of one US Senator eager to get reelected and because of the public relations offensive of some exponents the World Jewish Congress? And what about the credibility of a country that seeks the EU's protection in case of economic pressure and – in the same paragraph of its security policy report – refers to the principle of constructive abstention in case of EU decisions the government is not willing to support?

The second problem, that of growing numbers of refugees is more important. At the heights of the refugee flows from Kosovo to Switzerland the country received about 60'000 asylum seekers. Due to the increased number of refugees the government had to request additional funds of around 315 million Swiss Francs (US\$ 210 million). Together with the figures

⁴⁷ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 29 May 1999, p. 16.

⁴⁸ Personal interview with Karl Widmer, head of the project team "Civil Protection", Bern, 20 October 1999.

⁴⁹ Report 2000, p. 16, 44.

⁵⁰ A cynic would argue that this argument makes NATO membership inevitable because the USA would hardly bash a fellow alliance member.

from the regular budget and all other expenses caused by the crisis in the Balkans total spending amounted to approximately 1.2 billion Swiss Francs (US\$ 800 million) in 1999.⁵¹ Furthermore, the opening and the support of reception camps required the help of the Army because the civilian infrastructure was inadequate. This caused a new debate about the army's domestic role (see proposition 4). In addition the growing number of refugees nurtured the right wing critics of the government's asylum and migration policy and led to an ugly pre-election campaign of the *Schweizerische Volkspartei*. In such cases the government would indeed benefit from EU membership. Not only would it be easier to talk about burden sharing. New risks such as organized crime, money laundering and the trafficking of narcotics require international coordination and cooperation. With the new Amsterdam treaty and the decisions of the European Council taken in Tampere, Finland, the EU member states have set the stage for a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice.⁵² This will increase cooperation in home and justice affairs, and it is a real disadvantage that Switzerland cannot participate. The following paragraph illustrates the government's frustration:

Despite intensive efforts, Switzerland's efforts to at least partially participate in the multilateral European security schemes have not yet met with full success. Switzerland suggested negotiations on a parallel agreement to the Dublin Convention, tried to cooperate with Europol and made even soundings regarding the possibility of an institutionalized cooperation with the Schengen group, especially in the areas of visa policy, border controls, consular cooperation and the Schengen Information System.⁵³

At the turn of the century the Swiss government recognizes that the EU is more than just a free market. The Union has its own currency and it is becoming more active in security, home and justice affairs. Furthermore, the European Commission is gearing up its admission negotiations and has proposed talks with six more candidate countries and Turkey.⁵⁴ Not only is the EU deepening, it is also widening. Switzerland is not part of it, and participation from the outside will be harder than at any time before.

3 The Kosovo Crisis: Mixed results of the first test

Besides having to cope with a growing number of refugees at home, Switzerland's government has launched numerous programs to support the international community in Kosovo. Switzerland's bilateral and multilateral support falls into three broad categories: military, civilian, and economic.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Press Release by the Finance Department, Bern, 27 September 1999.

⁵² Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15/16 October, SN 200/99.

⁵³ Report 2000, p. 46.

⁵⁴ "Commission sets out an ambitious accession strategy and proposes to open accession negotiations with six more candidate countries", Brussels, 13 October 1999, IP/99/751; Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10/11 December 1999, SN 300/99, Paras. 10, 12.

⁵⁵ Heiko Borchert, "The Kosovo Conflict and the Swiss Contribution", *EUROPEAN SECURITY*, 8:4 (forthcoming). For more up-to-date information see the weekly 'Balkan Newsletter' issued by the Federal Department

Military support: Despite Swiss legal restrictions the Defense Department has been making military contributions to international humanitarian activities since NATO launched its air campaign in March 1999. At the request of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC), which Bern eagerly helped to set up, the Swiss government decided on 6 April 1999 to launch "Operation ALBA", which was completed on 24 July 1999.⁵⁶ The operation consisted of three Swiss Air Force Super-Puma helicopters accompanied, for security reasons, by members of the fortification guard. The operation provided logistical support for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by transporting commodities (more than 850 tons) and persons (approximately 5'000 including about 350 medical evacuations). To guarantee logistical support the Defense Department rented a CASA 235 transport aircraft from the Spanish Air Force, which costs about 4'900 Swiss Francs (US\$ 3'000) an operating hour.⁵⁷

After the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 establishing the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the government decided on 23 June 1999 to broaden its military contribution by setting up a military unit consisting of 160 unarmed volunteers. Deployment of SWISSCOY, which will cost about 55 million Swiss francs (US\$ 36 million) per year, began in late September. The troops will stay in Kosovo until the end of the year 2000. The military unit will closely cooperate with an Austrian battalion stationed in the German KFOR sector. For legal reasons the government emphasized that SWISSCOY will neither be subordinate to the Austrian battalion nor to NATO. The Austrians will guarantee the security of the Swiss soldiers who in turn will assist the former in reconstructing the civilian infrastructure (e.g. electricity, water distribution) and will provide logistical and medical support.⁵⁸

Civilian support: In order to help the victims of the conflict in Kosovo and Serbia Switzerland, together with Russia, Greece, and Austria, launched operation FOCUS at the end of April 1999. It is an international humanitarian aid program that coordinates the transport of commodities – about 1'000 tons until October 1999 – to the region and guarantees their distribution to those in need of urgent help. In addition the Swiss Disaster Relief Unit, which is part of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), has deployed numerous experts to the region. They help to coordinate humanitarian aid in the field and provide support in running the refugee camps primarily in Albania and Macedonia. By the end of 1999, 25 Swiss were working in Kosovo on behalf of the UN and the OSCE, 30 experts worked for the SDC.⁵⁹ Additionally, the government delegates experts for fact finding missions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).⁶⁰ In order to help speed up the establishment of a civil society the government also supports the establishment of a TV and radio broadcasting program organized by the UN and the OSCE. Radio Television Kosovo (R.T.K.) is headed by the President of the Swiss Radio and Broadcasting Company, Eric Lehmann.

of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police, and Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (<http://www.eda.admin.ch/site/g/publikationen/balkanbulletin.htm>).

⁵⁶ The Super-Puma helicopters returned to the Balkan in autumn 1999 as part of SWISSCOY.

⁵⁷ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 17 May 1999, p. 11.

⁵⁸ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 24 June 1999, p. 13; 16 October 1999, p. 15.

⁵⁹ Balkan Bulletin, dated 8 October 1999.

⁶⁰ On 11 August, 1999 Swiss state attorney Carla Del Ponte was appointed Prosecutor of the ICTY.

In May 1999, due to the growing number of refugees, the Swiss government also considered it necessary to discuss the need to prepare "emergency legislation" restricting the refugee's access to the Swiss labor market and to health and education services. While applauded by right-wing populists, this decision by incoming Minister of Justice, Ruth Metzler, caused storms of protests from left-wing politicians, women's and non-governmental refugee organizations. In August 1999, the government adopted a one year work ban for all refugees and those temporarily admitted. Furthermore the government envisages revising asylum legislation.

Economic support: The Swiss government has granted several loans to support humanitarian aid programs by the Swiss Disaster Relief Unit, the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The government also launched three programs worth 15 million Swiss Francs (US\$ 10 million), called "Cash for Shelter", "Cash for Education" and "Cash for Health", to support the FYR of Macedonia. Another 10 million Swiss Francs (US\$ 7 million) are designed to support Macedonia's balance of payments and should compensate for some of the trade and investment loss caused by the Kosovo conflict. In September the "Cash for Shelter" program was also launched in Kosovo, and the government started its "Cows for Kosovo" program, which aims at supporting local agriculture with over 500 cattle, cows, and bulls. Finally, in June 1999, the Swiss government decided to speed up the repatriation of Kosovo refugees. It launched a 250 million Swiss francs (US\$ 165 m) return program, which consists of 2'000 Swiss francs (US\$ 1'300) in cash for every refugee who decides to return voluntarily. It also includes material aid distributed in Kosovo to support and facilitate the reconstruction of their homes.⁶¹ About 12'000 refugees decided to take advantage of the offer, which was valid until November 1999, and about 3'000 submitted return applications.⁶² After this time financial and material aid will be reduced.

Proposition 6: Incoherent implementation by the various ministries is the greatest danger facing both the new Security Policy Report and the Foreign Policy Report issued in 1993.

Switzerland's policy during the Kosovo conflict produced mixed results. On 21 May 1999, Alexander Tschäppät, the Head of a parliamentary watchdog committee, correctly criticized that "every Minister seems to act on its own" and that Switzerland's policy lacks coherence. One Minister, he said, is playing hard ball with the refugees while another Minister salvages Kosovo refugees in her airplane. The critique aimed at Ruth Dreifuss, then President of the Federal Council. Tschäppät also criticized the absence of coordination between the SDC sponsored FOCUS program and the ICRC. Apart from a lack of adequate information he also blamed the institutionally weak position of the President as one of the main problems: "If the Federal Council has to cope with an 'explosive' issue one gets the impression that his work is becoming uncoordinated", Tschäppät argued.⁶³

The institutional weakness of the Federal executive is familiar, but Tschäppät's critique could be taken one step further. Lack of coherence can also be attributed to the inconsistent application of Switzerland's foreign policy principles laid down in the Report 93. Taking the

⁶¹ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 24 June 1999, p. 13.

⁶² Balkan Bulletin, dated 26 November 1999.

⁶³ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 22 May 1999, p. 13.

Foreign Policy Report as a benchmark shows that Swiss policy during the Kosovo conflict is characterized by a combination of progressive and regressive elements. The Defense Department has to be applauded for acting on the principles set forth by the foreign policy report. This is especially true for the decision to launch "Operation ALBA", to deploy SWISSCOY and to arm individual Swiss soldiers stationed in a combat zone. In doing so the Department operated at the limits of Swiss law.

Its humanitarian assistance program notwithstanding the Foreign Affairs Department played a more ambivalent role. Despite public condemnation by then Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti and contrary to the Report 93, Switzerland has not fully backed the sanctions imposed by the EU against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the one hand, the government supported the freezing of bank accounts, the ban of export credits, the export ban on goods and technology, and also refused the entry of about 300 high ranking Yugoslav politicians and their relatives. On the other hand, and due to a perceived incompatibility with the law of neutrality, the government refused to join the EU ban on oil transactions, but announced that such business would have to be notified. The government also decided not to support the EU's sanctions against the Yugoslav airline JAT, justified with reference to Swiss asylum policy. It was argued that sanctions against JAT would endanger repatriation of criminals and refugees with the airline's help at a later date.⁶⁴ These explanations sound strange, they stand in stark contrast to the principles of solidarity and multilateralism as demanded in the Report 93. They also suggest that there are differences within the administration with regard to the application of these principles.⁶⁵

The Justice Department's report was similarly ambivalent. Its cooperation with the UNHCR was certainly in line with the report's principle of actively supporting international organizations. However, the Department's strategy of making Switzerland more and more unattractive for refugees and the discussion of "emergency legislation" created an unpleasant feeling. No doubt, by welcoming about 60'000 refugees (total at the end of August 1999) and 140'000 to 150'000 permanent and temporary Kosovo residents, Switzerland is shouldering a heavy burden.⁶⁶ However, one should not forget that countries like Albania or Macedonia, which received more than 400'000 and almost 250'000 refugees in the past months, are paying a much higher tribute than Switzerland.⁶⁷ It seems that solidarity conflicts with domestic politics and that politicians kept an eye on the autumn 1999 election.

Proposition 7: *Although Switzerland can participate in international (military) operations its means are extremely limited. "Security through Cooperation", to be meaningful, must influence army planning and the government's armaments procurement policy.*

The Defense Department's analysis of the Kosovo conflict will have to affect the new structure of the armed forces and the new armament procurement strategy. Shifting the focus

⁶⁴ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 20 May, p. 13.

⁶⁵ Before the decisions to support EU's sanctions were taken there were differences within the Department of Foreign Affairs. While the Political Direction argued in favor of full participation the Direction for International Law had its doubts whether such a decision would be compatible with the law of neutrality. See: NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 17 May 1999, p. 13.

⁶⁶ Press release by the Department of Police and Justice, 8 April 1999.

⁶⁷ Figures by the UNCHR, dated 3 June 1999, quoted in the "Balkan Newsletter", dated 4 June 1999.

from the primacy of territorial defense to increased international military cooperation will have great consequences.

First, the problem of arming troops abroad must finally be solved. While the Parliament's Commission on Security Policy has recently agreed to arming forces abroad,⁶⁸ no final decision has yet been taken. Second, Switzerland will have to decide in advance about the forces to be deployed for international peace support operations. This will lead to changes in armament procurement. It is a well known fact that peace support forces have different needs from territorial defense forces. Among other things they require air transportation capabilities and armored vehicles. In addition they must be able to interact with NATO forces, i.e. they must comply with the Alliance's interoperability standards.⁶⁹ "Operation ALBA" has shown that the professionals of the Swiss Air Force are rapidly deployable and that they can interact with foreign armed forces. But "Operation ALBA" also exposed some weaknesses: Because the Swiss helicopters lacked NATO Transponder Codes they had to be accompanied by NATO helicopters in order to pass the "friend or foe" test by NATO's air defense and radar systems. Furthermore, in case of long term operations the Air Force needs Army support (caterpillars, container etc.). Finally, long distance operations are unthinkable without transportation aircrafts either owned by the Swiss Air Force or rented.⁷⁰ Third, recruiting principles for peace support operations must be analyzed carefully. The militia system does not produce the amount of troops necessary for intermediate and long term international involvement. Hence, some sort of professionalization will be needed. In addition one will also have to think about the legal aspects. A recruiting system that requires doctors to become temporary members of the federal service before taking part in the UNHCR support mission is simply too complicated and needs to be more flexible.⁷¹

Proposition 8: *So far, civilian peace-building activities do not get the necessary attention: they suffer from a lack of financial, technical and personal resources, and they are badly coordinated. With the establishment of a readily deployable Peace-Building Unit Switzerland could make a major contribution.*

Complaints about the disproportionate role played by armed forces and civilian groups in the process of peace-building are familiar. While the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords were precise and enforceable the annexes dealing with the Office of the High Representative, the coordination of the international organizations active in peace-building and the establishment of local administration remained vague. The same can be said about the way the international community is dealing with the Kosovo conflict. Although UNMK organization looks good on paper it is implemented very slowly. The main reasons are the member states' reluctance to provide civilian peace-building activities with the necessary financial,

⁶⁸ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 12 May 1999, p. 13

⁶⁹ For a broad assessment see: Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger, and Marcel Mäder, "Interoperabilität – Eckwert für die Armee XXI. Voraussetzung für alle Optionen militärischer Kooperation", NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 19 October 1999, p. 15.

⁷⁰ Walter Knutti, "Task Force 'ALBA'. Humanitärer Einsatz der Luftwaffe auf dem Balkan", ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITÄRZEITSCHRIFT, 165:9 (1999), p. 13-14; Arthur Friedrich Maiwald, "Internationale Rundschau: Schweiz", ÖSTERREICHISCHE MILITÄRISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 37:4 (1999), pp. 521-525.

⁷¹ NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 17 May 1999, p. 11.

technical and personal resources. Management is not "in time", and there is insufficient coordination between international organizations.

To make a long story short: Peace-building desperately needs improvement. Here, Switzerland could do a good and useful job. In fact, the government's 1998 report on Swiss PfP activities says that Switzerland will actively promote cooperation between the military and civilian side in case of international crisis and catastrophes.⁷² In 1996, the government made a first step into the right direction by setting up the Swiss Headquarters Support Unit (SHQSU) in Bosnia-Herzegovina to support the local OSCE mission. SHQSU is responsible for logistical support (including postal services) and for maintaining OSCE's vehicles. This approach should be developed further by establishing a Swiss Peace-building Unit consisting of a Headquarters Support Unit (HSU) and a Civilian Reconstruction Unit (CRU). The sub-units could be deployed either together or separately. The HSU should be seen as the nucleus for the administrative and technical support of an international peace-building mission. It would be staffed with the experts (e.g. IT specialists, executive personnel, technical specialists) and would be given the necessary technological resources. Endowed with the facilities needed to quickly set up a mission's headquarters, the HSU would be an indispensable civilian rapid reaction tool. The CRU would build on the experience and resources of the Swiss Disaster Relief Unit. It would be complemented by legal and administrative experts, business consultants, and election observers. Together with employees of international organizations these experts could set up a coordination center responsible for the management of international aid programs in the field.⁷³

4 Conclusions

In a heroic act the Swiss government has launched its new Security Policy Report labeled "Security through Cooperation". It implies stepping out of the country's economic, political and military isolation. However, the decision comes late, perhaps too late, and it is somewhat half hearted. The reason why the end of the Cold War in Europe offers no relief for Switzerland's foreign and security policy lies in the persistence of neutrality. However, we should not forget that neutrality can be modified. If this will not soon occur, the Swiss government risks being caught in a *neutrality trap*: Because of Switzerland's favorable security environment in post-Cold War Europe one is unwilling to question neutrality publicly. But it is precisely the lack of such a discussion which makes it impossible for Switzerland to benefit from the favorable security environment.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the Swiss government has missed the opportunity to take the right decisions earlier. Because of the neutrality trap the country has enormous problems participating in international military operations and training exercises. Additionally, its reluctance concerning the EU's political system has increased the distance between Bern and Brussels at a time when the Union is ready to have its own market, its own currency, its own

⁷² *Jahresbericht des Bundesrates über die Teilnahme der Schweiz an der Partnerschaft für den Frieden*, Bern, April 1999.

⁷³ Heiko Borchert and Jürg Martin Gabriel, "Die Schweizer Armee und die europäische Sicherheitsordnung: Herausforderungen und Aufträge", in Thomas Cottier and Alwin R. Kopsch (eds.), *Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur Europäischen Union* (Zürich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 1998), pp. 629.

army and even a kind of common "domestic policy". This leads to a first rate *foreign and security policy dilemma*: On the one hand NATO membership is technically possible but not politically desirable; on the other hand EU membership is politically desirable but not possible – at least not in the near future.⁷⁴

What can be done? First of all, the government will have to back away from its neutrality policy. In today's Europe neutrality no longer makes any sense. Following its strategic goal of EU membership the government should, preferably within the next five years, publicly declare its willingness to become a member of NATO and of the UN. During that period the government will have to launch a neutrality debate in parliament and a public relations campaign to convince the population. Second, Defense Minister Adolf Ogi must take the lead in revising the *Militärgesetz*. The question of arming Swiss troops stationed abroad must be settled before Army XXI gets started in 2003. Third, Adolf Ogi and his colleague from the Finance Ministry, Kaspar Villiger, must find ways to guarantee the acquisition of hardware needed to safeguard the interoperability of Army XXI and to equip peace support operations. Forth, despite difficulties the government will have to talk with the European Commission about the possibility of conducting admission negotiations. The government needs a clear-cut strategy, it requires a set of aims that are negotiable and that are fully backed by parliament, and it needs to get away from its policy of having full economic cooperation while enjoying full political independence. One cannot get one thing without compromising on another. That is the story behind the success of European integration and – to be honest – it was also the story behind the success of the Swiss Federation in the 19th century.

Dr. rer. publ. HSG Heiko Borchert
Consultant, Lucerne, Switzerland

⁷⁴ The results of a representative recent opinion poll (sample: about 2'200 persons) show that 69 % of the Swiss population are in favor of the country approaching the EU. 57 % would even back the country's EU membership. While 47 % of the Swiss also favor closer contacts with NATO, only 25 to 30 % would back Switzerland's NATO membership. See: NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, 18 December 1999, p. 14.