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**Managing Peace-building More Professionally
Improving Institutional Co-operation**

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Managing Peace-building More Professionally - Improving Institutional Cooperation¹

The "Agenda for Peace" published in 1992 by then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was designed to establish a coherent framework for the UN's efforts to maintain peace around the world. His study distinguished between conflict prevention, conflict settlement (including a broad spectrum ranging from the peaceful settlement of disputes, peacekeeping, peace enforcement to coercive measures) and post-conflict peace-building. The latter encompasses all "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".² Such action is called for in countries whose political, economic, and social structures are partially or entirely destroyed by violently prosecuted conflicts. Peace-building programmes consist of military and civilian support. The latter entails a broad range of political, legal and economic projects.

Effective conflict management cannot be limited to removing the consequences of a crisis but must attack its underlying causes. Therefore it requires the interplay of conflict prevention, conflict settlement and post-conflict peace-building. In this sense, peace-building can be understood as a first step towards successful conflict prevention because it is in the rebuilding of damaged political, social and economic structures that the foundations for their future stability or instability are laid. To make a stable development possible, international efforts aim at building democratic institutions based on the rule of law, establishing an economic order consistent with the ideal of the social market economy, securing the effectiveness of political, judicial and administrative structures and providing for democratic control of military, police and paramilitary forces. International organizations such as the OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the UN, international financial organizations, NATO and the WEU provide substantial assistance. They assist, advise and support countries financially and technically, help them to fulfil their international agreements (while overseeing this process), carry out negotiations and temporarily take over governmental responsibilities (transitional authority). These measures are intended to ease the integration of the affected countries into the international community and to strengthen the foundations for peaceful and non-violent relations between states.

There can be no doubt about the importance of peace-building efforts. However, the way in which the international community goes about it shows that a great deal remains to be done. Two main reasons deserve mentioning. First, working programmes of international organizations are hardly co-ordinated. This leads to substantial redundancies, particularly on the civilian side, which makes closer co-operation inevitable. Second, there is a huge gap between military and civilian efforts. While the former are adequately provided with financial, personnel and technical resources, the willingness of the international community to support efforts in the civilian area is quite rapidly exhausted. So it is in this field, as this essay will show, that proposals for improvements are most urgently needed.

1 This article is based on the author's dissertation: *Europas Sicherheitsarchitektur: Erfolgsfaktoren - Bestandsaufnahme - Handlungsbedarf* [Europe's Security Architecture: Where Do We Stand? Where Should We Go?], Baden-Baden 1999, which was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation as part of the National Research Programme 42 on Swiss foreign policy, Project No. 4042-47350.

2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, New York 1992, p. 11.

Lessons Learned

Before submitting recommendations for improving institutional co-operation in the field of peace-building we should first look at the lessons to be learned from previous efforts. The following list indicates which aspects must be given greater attention in the future:

- Civilian and military components of peace-building missions need better co-ordination. On the one hand this requires a better balance between the governments' contribution to both parts. On the other hand this implies a more task oriented management of civil-military relations in the field.
- Like the military command structures the organization and management structures of the civilian side must be designed with one central authority responsible for the whole civilian sector. Furthermore, experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania force us to reconsider the extent to which OSCE long term missions can henceforth assume overall responsibility for civilian co-ordination in crisis areas.
- When preparing the mandates institutional co-operation on the spot should be given greater attention by adopting guiding principles (e.g. nomination of liaison officers, establishment of co-ordination offices, joint press conferences).
- Peace-building missions should be given increased responsibility vis-à-vis the conflicting parties including the authority to impose decisions as long as they do not agree on measures.
- More integrated approaches for planning, implementing and evaluating international peace-building missions should be developed with all relevant international organizations.
- When establishing the missions special emphasis should be given to synergies accruing from the sharing of infrastructure among all international organizations.
- "Lead agency" concepts should be used in order to reduce the number of actors involved. In every area of peace-building one international organization should act as the chief co-ordinator and should be given executive power towards other international organizations engaged in the same area.
- The flow of information should be designed according to the "form follows function" principle, thereby favouring information sharing over "institutional autonomy".
- International organizations should co-ordinate their working programmes at an early stage in order to increase harmonization and reduce duplication.
- Experience gained from peace-building should be systematically evaluated thereby allowing to draw conclusions for future missions and establishing an institutional memory.

Improving Co-operation at an Early Stage

To make international peace-building efforts more effective, institutional co-operation must be improved and strengthened before field operations take place. *First*, the flow of information between European security organizations needs to be fundamentally redesigned. In the future it should no longer be permissible to strengthen or weaken the position of an international organization by withholding information. Rather, addressing the problems adequately means clarifying what kind of information should be available in what form, when and where. The process of gathering and distributing information should be redesigned with this principle in mind. Thereby special emphasis should be given to overcome the reticence of participating

States and to abandon the carefully protected principle of "institutional autonomy". The following examples illustrate how this goal could be achieved.

Assessing the political situation in a country is of importance both for the EU and for the international financial organizations. In judging that situation there ought to be closer co-operation with the OSCE and/or UN missions in the field whose regularly prepared situation reports could be made available to the economic organizations. Moreover, their local offices should be more fully integrated into analyzing the economic situation in a crisis area to ensure the optimal distribution of financial assistance and to promote the building of local economic structures. Furthermore, economic disturbances can be a source of political conflict. For example economic deterioration in a country may impel the EU Commission to contact the High Commissioner on National Minorities. This might be the case when the Commission has evidence that minorities are economically discriminated and that political decisions are needed to ameliorate their situation.

Similar considerations could apply to the use of military intelligence satellites. They play an important role not only in obtaining early warning of attacks but also in observing trouble spots, monitoring humanitarian actions and disarmament agreements, and in gathering strategic or tactical data.³ If there is for instance uncertainty about the behaviour of military forces in cases of political turmoil the availability of such intelligence information could clarify the situation while at the same time enhancing the capacities of a political organization like the OSCE, which does not have such sources of information on its own.

Second, because knowledge and experience are becoming ever more important and both depend on the individuals who possess them, international organizations must make better use of their human resources. The systematic exchange of employees would represent a first step in this direction. One objective, for example, might be to arrange for a general rotation of employees, within a clearly defined field of work, for a period of six months. This exchange would be designed to give each side a look at the other's day to day work while improving understanding of the organization's specific needs; it would make it easier for people to get to know each other, improve co-operation and contribute to socialization. The participating employees would garner valuable experience which they could apply to their own daily work after their return.

Especially if the OSCE is to take over a bigger role as overall co-ordinator of peace-building in the future, it could benefit from the systematic rotation of personnel. One could imagine, for example, an agreement along these lines with the Council of Europe or with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) covering dealings with minorities and the return of refugees to their homelands; an exchange of the EU and the international financial organizations with the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities; or one could think about rotation of personnel between the OSCE and NATO or the WEU in order to improve civil-military relations. Overall, this periodic exchange of personnel - which requires close attention to the needs of the "interns" and calls for ways of easing the transfer of knowledge within each organization - appears well suited to overcoming bureaucratic obstacles and to contributing to a pan-European way of addressing the relevant problems.

Beyond this one could also consider methods of joint training and continued education which would further the participants' understanding of the need to expand co-operation. In principle, two different offers can be distinguished.

3 Cf. Assembly of WEU, A European Intelligence Policy, Document 1517, 13 May 1997, Para. 35.

- *Seminars* are conducted on specific subjects and aim at sharing experiences, transmitting knowledge and establishing personal contacts. With the aid of case studies seminars could provide practical insights into the internal proceedings of various organizations.
- *Simulations* go a step further. In the military services it has long been customary to practice field operations in advance. A similar approach does not exist in the political field, however. It would be helpful, for example, if collaboration between the UN, the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe, NATO, the WEU and other international organizations could be practised in a two-week exercise under "realistic" conditions. Simulations of this kind should not be interpreted as computer-aided games. Rather, they are designed to improve personal communication between the participants thereby raising their understanding of the different conditions in which their organisations operate. This in turn could lead to a better mutual understanding and promote insights into the need for joint action.

Finally, in line with these efforts we ought to push for the establishment of a permanent training centre for the support and improvement of civil reconstruction work. It could be established by a number of countries with the help of non-governmental actors and would offer its services to the OSCE and the United Nations. This school would train international police forces and civilian mission members jointly. It would aim at ensuring an equally high level of training for all mission members and at providing specific knowledge and general background information about the area the members will work in. Participants should be required to attend appropriate courses before entering on their missions. Likewise this institution should systematically evaluate the experience of mission members in order to adapt its training concepts. Furthermore, it should promote the sharing of experience and information among the mission members which will contribute to the establishment of an institutional peace-building memory.

Third, in order to promote a pan-European view of the problems laying ahead of us, joint working groups should be established. First of all there should be a systematic analysis of the areas in which the working programmes of international organizations overlap. In addition, the responsibilities of each organization in these issue areas should be clarified. Thereafter, direct communication should be made easier by setting up contact points and appointing liaison officers, as is already provided for in the OSCE's Platform for Co-operative Security.⁴ Finally, joint working groups should be established to work out action plans in advance and to co-ordinate the work of each organization at an early stage. One could envision the following working groups:

- *Armed Forces*: NATO, the WEU and the OSCE could co-ordinate their work for the reestablishment and reorganization of military and police forces. The employees of the two alliances have concrete military experience to offer and the OSCE employees could ease the integration of this work into the important task of building up democratic structures based on the rule of law.
- *Minorities*: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, members of the Council of Europe, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and EU representatives could team up their efforts to improve the situation of minorities by better co-ordinating their political, legal and economic programmes.

⁴ Cf. Sixth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Copenhagen, 18-19 December 1997, Annex 1: Common Concept for the Development of Co-operation between Mutually-Reinforcing Institutions, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1998, Baden-Baden 1999, pp. 449-451.

- *Economic reconstruction:* This task is primarily dealt with by the EU and other financial organizations. A joint working group could help ensuring that available financial resources are used effectively and efficiently, supporting small and medium-sized companies that are especially important for a sustainable economic growth, and backing up the establishment of financial systems and other economic structures that are properly designed and prepared to handle the demands of world-wide economic competition. While the financial resources that are indispensable for running a firm can be obtained as venture capital, from capital markets or in the form of a loan, it is generally much harder to acquire the necessary managerial skills. Thus new ideas are needed for institutionalizing exchange programmes and supporting start-up companies (business angels), for increasing co-operation in research and development among well established companies, and for expanding the support and the involvement of professional consulting firms.
- *Administrative structures:* On the one hand administrative structures have to conform with the rule of law. On the other hand their redesign should take account of the principles of New Public Management with its strong emphasis on performance orientation. Here, representatives of the OSCE, the EU and international financial organizations could, for example, co-ordinate their work with professional consulting firms.
- *Organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering:* It has come to be accepted that countries marked by war or conflict are especially attractive to practitioners of these forms of crime.⁵ There are numerous specialized international institutions such as the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) and Interpol which are involved in combating these problems and their causes. Therefore, OSCE field missions, the country offices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and international financial organizations should establish integrated approaches and work closely to fight these crimes.

Improving Co-operation in the Field

Strengthening civilian capacities is the first step in order to improve institutional co-operation in crisis areas. Thereby two important military lessons should be learned: First, crisis management, peacekeeping or peace enforcement troops assigned to NATO or the WEU are "prepared units". This means that they are chosen for the task at hand and they are given the appropriate composition and equipment. Second, light and mobile command posts in which soldiers can move around easily have proven indispensable for such operations. They provide secure accommodation for all command and control equipment and serve as a protected area for meetings and situation briefings.⁶

If we apply these thoughts to the civilian aspects of peace-building we should think about establishing a rapidly deployable OSCE Peace-Building Unit.⁷ It should consist of a technical

5 Cf. Kurt Schelter/Michael Niemeier, The Fight against Organized Crime as a Challenge for Europe - for the OSCE as well?, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1995/1996, Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 325-332.

6 Cf. R. Uwe Proll, Führung sicherstellen [Ensure Command and Control], in: Europäische Verteidigung. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme [European Defence. A Critical Stock-taking], Bonn 1997, p. 82; Horst Welsch, Containerisierte Gefechtsstände. Eine innovative Systemlösung der Firma Dornier [Containerized Command Posts. An Innovative System Solution from Dornier], in: *ibid.*, p. 83.

7 Cf. Heiko Borchert/Jürg Martin Gabriel, Die Schweizer Armee und die europäische Sicherheitsordnung: Herausforderungen und Aufträge [The Swiss Army and the European Security Order: Challenges and Tasks], in: Thomas Cottier/Alwin Kopse (Eds.), Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur Europäischen Union.

Headquarters Support Unit working along the lines of the Swiss "Yellow Berets" in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a Civilian Reconstruction Unit which would consist of experts for election monitoring, state-building and economic consulting.⁸ These two sub-units could be sent to crisis areas separately or together as an independent element of the mission. Depending on the situation on the ground two security options are possible: working out an agreement with international military units that protect the civilian forces or backing them up with a military unit of their own. The fact that the Swiss "Yellow Berets" have already been employed by the OSCE to transport material for the establishment of a new mission to Minsk (Belarus) shows that the OSCE has a great demand for such services.⁹ Especially during the first stages of establishing a field mission the assistance of an OSCE Peace-Building Unit would ensure that civil operations could be set up quickly and flexibly.

Second, in order to improve co-ordination among the different missions in a crisis area "International Peace-Building Bureaus" should be established which would be financed out of the regular budgets of the participating organizations. When establishing such a network the UNDP offices and the Office for the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) should be taken into account. They have a global outreach and co-ordinate the work of the UN special agencies. It should therefore be analyzed whether and how they could perform the same tasks for other organizations and if they could share their office rooms with other missions in the field. The establishment of joint offices in crisis areas would create a central location to which all actors - national and international, governmental and non-governmental - could turn, where they could be competently and thoroughly briefed and where resources (e.g. press services, secretariat, etc.) would be made available for the use of all. Representatives of international organizations would be assigned to each office, when necessary, as liaison officers to co-ordinate their organization's activities and to call in additional experts as needed. If a number of joint offices exist in a crisis area the responsibility for overall co-ordination should be assigned to one of them.

Third, in the case of large and demanding missions such as the ones operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Kosovo, international organizations should no longer launch individual missions. Instead they should form an "International Peace-Building Mission", for which a sample organizational chart is shown below. While international organizations would still provide the necessary input, the mission would no longer be organized along organizations, but along the problems that have to be solved.

The mission would be directed by the Head of Mission, chosen either from the group of international organizations or participating States. He would have an office and a staff of his own which would give him both administrative and substantive support. In addition to directing the mission he would be responsible for informing international organizations and individual countries on progress achieved. If necessary, he should be given the authority to impose decisions as long as the conflicting parties do not agree on measures.

The management of the international mission would be assumed by a Steering Committee that would have particular responsibility for political planning. It would consist of the Head of Mission and the chairmen of the Working Groups, including the Administrative and Technical Support Units. If conditions in the crisis area made it necessary to protect the international reconstruction efforts or if armed forces played a role in monitoring a cease-fire or enforcing

Brennpunkte und Auswirkungen [Swiss Entry into the European Union: Critical Aspects and Consequences], Zurich 1998, pp. 609-636, here: p. 629.

8 Similarly, the 335th Civil Affairs Command of the US Army, which was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, was made up of managers from both the public and private side, engineers and bankers. See: Michael C. Williams, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Oxford 1998, p. 62.

9 Interview with Marco Cantieni, Commander of the Swiss Headquarters Support Unit, Sarajevo, 14 March 1998.

the peace then the military Commander-in-Chief would also be a member of the Steering Committee.¹⁰

The most vital services would be provided by an Administrative and a Technical Support Unit. The former would be responsible for press matters and public relations, would exercise financial control and would take care of the needs of the non-governmental organizations active in the crisis area. The latter, modelled according to the Swiss "Yellow Berets" stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would be responsible for maintaining the joint vehicle pool, providing transport, logistical and postal services and ensuring information technology support.

The reconstruction work would be co-ordinated by so-called Working Groups that would implement the strategic guidelines of the Steering Committee. Since the actual structure of an "International Peace-Building Mission" would have to be adapted to local conditions the organizational chart is no more than an illustrative example. Experts from international organizations and from individual states along with locally recruited personnel would be assigned to the Working Groups on military affairs, infrastructure, economic recovery, governmental affairs, and humanitarian affairs. It is obvious that, owing to issues that straddle these topics, additional teams would have to be set up. For example, media reporting during an election campaign could result in an overlapping between the Working Groups on governmental and humanitarian affairs. Rebuilding the traffic infrastructure can under certain circumstances require that bridges be built with the support of military engineer units. Moreover, issues related to the return of refugees involve the humanitarian and governmental groups. This is especially true when property rights have to be established or when political rights must be attributed.

In contrast to independent and competing missions we have had hitherto, an international mission organized along these lines would have the advantage that many services previously delivered separately would now be available "in a single house". In particular, these would include situation analysis, which can be supported by satellite information from NATO or the WEU, early warning, decision-making now facilitated by more centralized structures, and policy planning which would follow a more integrated approach. In addition, lines of communication would be drastically shortened, the cost of co-ordination would be lowered, public information would be easier, the mission would take a unified position vis-à-vis local parties, its own image would be strengthened, and it would be easier to deal with personnel bottlenecks. Under these conditions lessons learned would be made easier because experiences would no longer be limited to each international organizations but would be worked up within a joint framework.

10 Based on experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina it can be assumed that NATO participation in a mission will require military command authority to lie with the Commander-in-Chief. He, for his part, is subordinate to SACEUR and thus to the North Atlantic Council or, in the case of an allied military command led by the WEU (CJTF), to the (European) DSACEUR and the WEU Council.




Figure: Organizational Chart of an International Peace-Building Mission

Learning Systematically

The idea of creating "learning organizations" aims at ensuring the best possible ways an organization can adapt to a changing environment and to the challenges that emerge from it. This requires two things: The employees' knowledge must be transferred to the organization, and the collective knowledge available within an organization must be developed further. Thus the use of available knowledge and the opening up of new areas of knowledge are of central importance.

Following this idea the experience so far gathered in peace-building must be systematically evaluated in order to ensure that future missions are optimally planned and managed. In 1995, the UN therefore established a "Lessons Learned Unit" within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations which serves many purposes. It examines ongoing and completed missions with an eye on the lessons to be learned, makes appropriate proposals for improvement, monitors their implementation, and contributes to the "institutional memory" of the UN. With this in mind the unit members conduct interviews in the field, question UN members, prepare their own reports, organize seminars, make use of the appropriate research literature and maintain a document centre of their own in which relevant material is made available.

Similarly, the OSCE ought to consider setting up a learning unit in its Conflict Prevention Centre. With regard to improving institutional co-operation one of its jobs would be to take a look at the conditions that must be met in order to have smooth co-operation on the local

scene. Beyond that, it should systematically evaluate the experience garnered in connection with: the definition of mandates and the resources to be made available to the missions, planning, information management, security of mission members, logistics, budgeting and financing, initial and ongoing training of mission members, and methods of dealing with the population in the mission area.¹¹

Along with the analysis of one's own work, regular use should be made of experience in the military sector and insights from management theory and New Public Management. The latter have for some time been discussing the consequences which emerge e.g. from the trend towards autonomous and flexibly operating units that carry out their duties independently and according to clearly defined strategic guidelines. A great deal of attention is also devoted to information management because it is seen to be the back bone of modern organizations. The following example illustrates how peace-building could benefit from these insights.

Past experience has shown that more attention should be given to the exchange of information between missions, as well as between these missions and their individual headquarters. This requires improving personal communication and ensuring the supply of adequate technical equipment. An OSCE mission that assumed overall responsibility for co-ordination in the crisis area could establish a central data bank in which all relevant decisions, minutes of meetings, agenda planning and other documents such as maps and mining charts would be stored and from which they could be retrieved with appropriate security arrangements. For the sake of consistency, all relevant services should be out-sourced to professional bidders from the private sector. Their employees would be taken on as mission members and thus be able to provide local support.¹² The OSCE would define the performance tasks that must be met by the companies and would be freed from the concrete implementation of information technology systems. This would make available scarce resources that could be used elsewhere. Evaluations of the services provided by third parties should be conducted by the proposed learning unit which, in the event of unsatisfactory performance, would propose appropriate measures to the Secretary General.

Conclusions

Peace-building is essential for security and stability in the OSCE area. By reorienting ruined social, economic, and political/administrative structures according to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and the social market economy, peace-building lays the foundation for peaceful and prosperous relations between states. However, the civilian side of peace-building has not yet gained the same attention as the military side. It is therefore not as adequately planned, carried through and evaluated as it should be. In order to close these gaps this essay has proposed various improvements. First, it was argued that institutional co-operation must be improved at an early stage. This can be achieved by redesigning the flow of information according to the needs of the involved international organizations, by regular exchange and joint training of their employees, and by setting-up joint working groups in different issue areas. Second, institutional co-operation in crisis areas should be improved by fundamentally backing up the civilian capacities, by establishing "International Peace-Building Bureaus"

11 The *Lessons Learned Unit* of the United Nations has published a handbook on these matters entitled "Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent Experience". It is also available online (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/handbuk.htm>).

12 This approach has already been discussed in the military services for the maintenance of sensitive electronic equipment. See: Joachim Rohde, *The Roles of Arms Industries in Supporting Military Operations*, working paper of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Foundation Science and Politics), AP 3045, October 1997.

and, in particularly demanding cases, by deploying joint "International Peace-Building Missions". Third, peace-building must be constantly and systematically evaluated. This requires a performance analysis of each mission as well as a comparison with military experience and insights gained from management theory and New Public Management.