

The Lessons of Kosovo: Boon or Bust for Transatlantic Security?

by Heiko Borchert and Mary N. Hampton

The NATO intervention in Kosovo in spring 1999 was a watershed event for transatlantic relations. On the one hand, it was NATO's first military intervention, and its success reconfirmed a half-century of U.S.-Western European cooperation and community-building in their security relations. On the other hand, Operation Allied Force and the operations preceding and following it deepened fissures in the transatlantic relationship that had begun to emerge with the end of the Cold War. The retreat of Soviet power, the unification of Germany, and NATO and the EU's enlargement processes each in turn contributed to the transformation of Western security relations. If the Gulf War reflected the last military intervention led by the U.S. as a Cold War power, Allied Force offered the first glimpse of the contest over Western interventionism emerging in the early moments of the post-Cold War order.¹ NATO's intervention into Kosovo quickened the pace of change in transatlantic relations and fueled the European challenge to the mantle of Western political leadership worn by the U.S. throughout the Cold War and into the early post-Cold War period. Thus, Allied Force represents an important transition point in the shift from one international order to the next, one still murky in its outline.

¹On the construction of international order in postwar periods, see G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Heiko Borchert owns a business and political consultancy in Switzerland. He is author of *Europas Sicherheitsarchitektur: Erfolgsfaktoren, Bestandsaufnahme, Handlungsbedarf* (Europe's Security Architecture: Where Do We Stand? Where Should We Go?), (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999). **Mary N. Hampton** teaches at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and is associate professor of political science at the University of Utah. She is author of *The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification* (Westport, London: Praeger, 1996). The views presented here are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Air Force, Air War College, or any other U.S. government agency. The authors thank René Eggenberger, Stanley Sloan, Colonel A. J. Torres, and Milada Vachudova for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Divergences have occurred on the road toward achieving balance between national power and international order. Power is about capability; order refers to governance. The United States and Europe drew very different lessons from their experiences in Kosovo about power and order, about military vs. nonmilitary means of conflict resolution, and importantly about the merits of multilateralism vs. unilateralism. Briefly put, Operation Allied Force, NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the June 1999 Stability Pact for South East Europe reinforced the European proclivity to pursue national goals through multilateralism and to seek the creation of an international order based on soft power, or "security governance."² Such an order reduces the currency of military power as an instrument of security maintenance and enhances that of multilateral diplomacy and international institutions. For the United States, Allied Force in particular confirmed the supremacy of U.S. technology and the inadequacies of European war fighting readiness. The experience reinforced the desire of many U.S. analysts, elites, and policy makers to cut, or at least loosen, the strings binding American interests to Europe's in order to protect the United States' standing as the sole superpower. The United States increasingly pursued narrowly defined interests at the expense of fostering and leading the Western order. The impact of September 11 on this proclivity is still unfolding. As the United States shifted its attention toward Asia and global interests, Europe proceeded to weave an international order that continues to resist addressing the power requirements needed to underwrite it. In short, NATO's interventions into Kosovo may have had the ironic effect of undermining transatlantic solidarity at the very moment that it was successfully tested.

Lessons Learned that Enhance Transatlantic Solidarity

By launching Allied Force, democratic members of the transatlantic community underlined their willingness to use force against a government that strongly abused the community's foundational norms. This demonstrated the importance these countries attribute to commonly shared values and bolstered the "democratic peace" proposition that has become the leitmotiv in reconstructing Europe's security architecture after the Cold War. Finally, launching Allied Force within the NATO framework was a strong signal to keep the Alliance engaged in order to safeguard its relevance.

Values Matter

Shared Western values concerning the unacceptability of ethnic cleansing and genocide were clearly on display in the NATO decision to

²Joylon Howorth coined the phrase "Security Governance" in *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000), pp. 87–91.

intervene and remain engaged in Kosovo. Most important, the member states of NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have established a framework of international norms around the concept of liberal democracy. Along with clear prescriptions on how state–society relations should be organized, the norms of Western institutions also include respect for human rights. Upholding jointly agreed values of democratic governance revealed the ever-growing, but unevenly held, sentiment in the West that rights of national sovereignty are abrogated in the face of egregious human rights abuses by the state. This reasoning is also reflected by recent actions of the UN Security Council, which has interpreted gross and massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (e.g., Iraq, Kosovo) and the violation of democracy (e.g., Haiti) as threats to international peace.³

For policy makers and publics in the United States, Britain, Poland, and especially Germany, echoes of past Western inaction in the face of egregious human rights abuses by an expansionist state helped create a Western solidarity of purpose. For Germans, intervening militarily and multilaterally for the first time since the birth of post-war German democracy to stop the abuses of Slobodan Milosevic’s regime enabled them to prove that they had become a steadfast democracy, ready to act with other Western democracies. German politicians were not the only ones to evoke the past. Madeleine Albright proclaimed “This is not Munich” during a 1999 diplomatic conference in London prior to peace talks in Rambouillet.⁴

Democratic Peace Confirmed

That values mattered in launching Allied Force confirms to some measure the democratic peace theory. According to this school, democracies share certain foundational norms, such as the right of individuals to fair treatment under impartial law and the observance and civil rights for its citizens by states. Bruce Russett argues that one of the most important norms is that which promotes “compromise and peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence.” These norms are transferable to the international system and to other democracies.⁵

Consistent with democratic peace theory, collectively held values about human rights and liberties abuses played an important role in forging

³Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, “Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the ‘Construction’ of Security in Post-Cold War Europe,” *International Organization* (Summer 1999), pp. 505–35; Thomas Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” *American Journal of International Law* (Jan. 1992), pp. 46–91; Jörg Paul Müller, *Der politische Mensch: Menschliche Politik* (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1999), pp. 132–42; *Humanitarian Interventions: Legal and Political Aspects* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), pp. 64–9.

⁴Quoted in Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), p. 61.

⁵Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 31.

the transatlantic commitment to halt Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—that is, the theory explains why NATO allies agreed that such abuses of democratic values indeed justified the use of force to stop it. In fact, most analysts of the democratic peace literature concur that democracies are more than willing to go to war against clearly abusive non-democracies. Consistent with these findings, German ambassador to the United States Wolfgang Ischinger, a longtime advisor in the Foreign Office during the Kohl years, observes that the Kosovo conflict was not about traditional power politics: “Instead of national interests, the international community pursued the goal of implementing the basic principles of law and humanity.”⁶ Here, then, is the non-Westphalian justification for the use of force.

Keeping NATO Involved to Safeguard its Credibility

That NATO was finally chosen as the organization to halt Serb aggression reflected a solidarity in the transatlantic security community and a collective commitment throughout the campaign to ensure NATO's success. It also reflected the fact that NATO remains the only militarily credible institution in Europe. But General Wesley Clark's reflections on his role as Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR) indicate that this outcome was far from sure. From his personal involvement in Bosnia, Clark believed that NATO must remain engaged in Kosovo or it would lose credibility. However, getting NATO engaged required serious arm-wrestling at different levels: in Washington to align the Pentagon with the State Department and the White House, in Brussels to overcome European reluctance to use military power, and in Belgrade to get Milosevic to agree that NATO should provide air protection for the OSCE's diplomatic observer and later verification missions.⁷

NATO's success in Kosovo was also an initial success for its enlargement policy, because the three newly-acceded members proved, albeit unevenly, supportive of the mission. Poland assisted most ardently, Hungary opened its military bases and airfields and agreed to NATO overflights, and internal critiques within the Czech Republic at least did not endanger the mission. Furthermore, two candidates for membership, Bulgaria and Romania, backed NATO's action politically and logistically.⁸

⁶ Wolfgang Ischinger, “Kosovo: Germany Considers the Past and Looks to the Future,” in Wolfgang Uwe Friedrich (ed.), *The Legacy of Kosovo: German Politics and Policies in the Balkans* (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2000), pp. 27–37; quotation on p. 27.

⁷ Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2001), esp. chapters 4–6.

⁸ Milada Vachudova, “The Atlantic Alliance and Kosovo: Enlargement and the Behavior of New Allies,” in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Péter Tólas and László Valki, “The new entrants: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic,” in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 201–12.

Lessons Learned that Challenge Transatlantic Solidarity

Nevertheless, Allied Force also illuminated and deepened some of the fissures in the transatlantic relationship that the democratic peace theory does not readily accommodate. The United States and Europe evidently learned strikingly different lessons about military intervention specifically and conflict resolution generally. These differences in large measure reflect diverging dedication to the issues of power and order. Washington increasingly asserted its power prerogatives at the expense of the responsibilities associated with order maintenance, or became increasingly unilateral. Many policy makers and analysts equate multilateralism and multipolarity, arguing that multilateralism somehow reduces U.S. readiness and capabilities. In fact, multilateralism refers to the process by which foreign policy is conducted, not to the power capabilities that underwrite it. Europe, on the other hand, has become ever more committed to multilateralism, charging full speed ahead with the construction of regional institutions and regimes, while continuing to downplay the more testy questions of underlying power capabilities and their associated costs.

The growing unilateralism vs. multilateralism divide and increasing distance between Europe's soft and America's hard power approaches to international politics can be interpreted as a magnification of the transatlantic division of labor practiced during the Cold War. Celeste Wallander argues that European NATO members chose not to develop certain types of forces because they knew the United States would provide these capabilities to the Alliance.⁹ This argument can be taken one step further: it was the very existence of U.S. hard power capability—ultimately at hand to defend Europe—that was instrumental in establishing Europe's supranational integration process. However, this division of labor led to certain path dependencies on both sides of the Atlantic. While hard power remained a legitimate and necessary means to guarantee the United States' global interests, Europeans learned to cooperate without recourse to military means. The Balkan interventions reinforced the increasingly assertive soft power approach to conflict resolution that Europe had been able to develop since the end of the Cold War.

Policy Implications of the Technology Gap

The 1991 Gulf War already showed that the technology gap in Euro-Atlantic military relations had widened. As the Gulf War was an international coalition of the willing, executed mainly under U.S. political and military leadership, NATO itself was only indirectly involved. By contrast, Allied Force

⁹Celeste Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War," *International Organization* (Autumn 2000), pp. 705–35.

was the first example of NATO war-fighting, and the message of Europe's military ineffectiveness was driven home in most dramatic ways.¹⁰

During Allied Force the United States dominated in precision and stealth technologies, both of which were critical to the air campaign. The United States also dominated in the area of precision-guided munitions, which accounted for 35 percent of all munitions used during Allied Force, and provided the unmanned aerial vehicles that were extensively used and proved critical in an operation where ground troops did not play their traditional wartime role of assisting target acquisition.¹¹ Thus, by the time of the intervention in Kosovo, the transatlantic technology gap had widened to an unacceptable degree, especially for the Europeans. To address the serious imbalance, the Alliance endorsed the Defense Capabilities Initiative promoted by U.S. defense secretary William Cohen and endorsed by NATO at the 1999 Washington Summit. It was designed to encourage all NATO allies to focus on closing critical technological and capabilities gaps in five functional issue areas: deployment and mobility, sustainability and logistics, command and control information systems, effective engagement, and force survivability.¹²

The transatlantic technology gap had at least two significant effects on the execution of Allied Force that reinforced transatlantic misunderstanding and fueled U.S. unilateralist tendencies. First, it led to a two-level communications system. The United States created its own Air Tasking Order to protect highly classified American stealth technology, thus leaving Europeans out of the loop in assigning targets. This U.S. proclivity to secrecy fostered a lack of intra-Alliance trust and complicated war-fighting coordination, while the technology gap created an interoperability problem.

Second, the U.S. predisposition to control reinforced what Europeans already perceived as American unilateralism and strengthened their determination to enhance Europe's own military/security identity and readiness. Ironically, the development of a credible European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), housed in the EU and promising autonomous capability and decision making, could encourage behavior opposite of its stated objective. Rather than encourage better transatlantic interoperability and shared political–military leadership, the emergence of ESDP could instead eventually lead to two unintended outcomes. On the one hand, it could cement the two-tier alliance that NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson warned against, where the United States would do the high-tech

¹⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo: Executive Summary* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999); and Klaus Naumann, "Kosovo—Modell für die Zukunft?" in Erich Reiter (ed.), *Der Krieg um das Kosovo 1998/1999* (Mainz: v Hase und Koehler), pp. 23–38.

¹¹ Grant Hammond, "Myths of the Air War over Serbia," *Aerospace Power Journal* (Winter 2000), pp. 78–86.

¹² See discussion in *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Department, Dec. 2000), esp. p. 15.

war fighting up front and the Europeans the messy mop-up peacekeeping work afterward.¹³

On the other hand, the introduction of ESDP could over time produce on both sides of the Atlantic a reduced commitment to NATO as the security architecture of first choice in Europe. This trend may be muted by the fact that for the time being EU members will rely on military assets assigned to NATO, and the Europeans are far from making the kinds of real commitments that would be needed to produce a credible autonomous security structure. Furthermore, in order to certify the readiness of troops available for military actions without U.S. involvement, the EU will also rely on NATO's interoperability standards. These standards have the potential to speed up the process of converging planning and armaments procurement processes among European nations.

Confusing Power and Order: Dangers to the Transatlantic Relationship

Allied Force fueled the ongoing U.S. debate concerning national power. While the jury is still out on the lasting effects of September 11, the critics of multilateralism have grown stronger under the Bush administration than under the previous two presidents. The Bush administration seemed in its first months determined to assert a more unilateralist foreign policy than its predecessor, a foreign policy reflecting more narrowly defined U.S. interests, preserving U.S. assets for the "big fights"—those that directly threaten "vital" American security interests—and spending more energy on newly recognized "strategic competitors."¹⁴ The Clinton administration, while occasionally misguided in assessing how its actions might be perceived abroad, was purposeful in avoiding policies that were or could be interpreted as unilateralist.¹⁵ As for the isolationist sentiments in the United States that often accompany unilateralist thinking and are particularly strong in the Congress and the military, a state as powerful as the United States simply cannot successfully pursue isolationist policies: they will likely become, and at a minimum appear to all others, unilateralist. Christopher Hemmer observes: "(T)he proponents of unilateralism ought to worry about how the line between unilateralism and isolationism can become thin to the point of vanishing."¹⁶

¹³ "Dinner Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General," IISS, Arundel House, London, Mar. 22, 2000 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000322b.htm>).

¹⁴ On the unilateralist agenda see Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan./Feb. 2000), pp. 45–62. On the consequences of the distinction between multilateralism and unilateralism, see Ivo H. Daalder, "Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?" *International Affairs* (July 2001), pp. 531–45. For a discussion of vital vs. other national interests, see Joseph Nye, "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1999), pp. 22–35.

¹⁵ Stanley Sloan, "The U.S. Role in the World: Indispensable Leader or Hegemon?" *CRS Report for Congress*, 97-1046 F (Dec. 15, 1998), esp. p. 5.

¹⁶ For an analysis and comparison of U.S. unilateralism and isolationism, see Christopher Hemmer, "Empire Without Tears: the Sequel?" *Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Summer/Fall 2000), pp. 163–71; quotation on p. 165.

Many of the proponents of U.S. unilateralism equate multilateralism with multipolarity. Such critics assume, for example, that acting multilaterally, in concert with its European allies, diminishes American power. Charles Krauthammer, representative of unilateralist advocates, has heralded what he calls the “new unilateralism,” observing with approval that:

[W]e now have an administration willing to assert American freedom of action and the primacy of American national interests. Rather than contain American power within a vast web of constraining international agreements, the new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends.¹⁷

In an article promoting a more unilateralist United States, Krauthammer observes:

It is hard to understand the enthusiasm of so many for a diminished America and a world reverted to multipolarity. Our principle aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current international system by enforcing, maintaining, and extending the current peace.¹⁸

It is not at all clear why these U.S. objectives are better provided for through unilateralism. The argument that the United States is more empowered when unshackled from the constraints of its self-inflicted multilateral binds is one made frequently since Allied Force. It is an argument that confuses leadership and power. In truth, the multilateral order the United States was instrumental in creating at the end of World War II enhanced its power. Multilateralism lessened the need for employing expensive instruments of coercion by legitimizing U.S. leadership, both at home and abroad, through interlocking webs of agreements, institutions and regimes. As John Ikenberry has put it: “The lesson of order building in this century is that international institutions have played a pervasive and ultimately constructive role in the exercise of American power.”¹⁹

Leadership has to do with power but it does not equal power. The crucial variable is purpose. Unlike naked power-wielding, “leadership is inseparable from followers’ needs and goals.”²⁰ Since leadership results from an interactive process where one actor is presumed to be the leader and other actors are willing to follow, the leader must be able to convince the followers. Leadership is therefore based on persuasion and normative consensus. Once the leader’s commitment wanes, replaced by neglect or resort to attempted coercion, followers will find the first occasion to defect.²¹

¹⁷ Charles Krauthammer, “The New Unilateralism,” *Washington Post* (June 8, 2001).

¹⁸ Charles Krauthammer, “The Bush Doctrine: ABM, Kyoto, and the New American Unilateralism,” *Weekly Standard* (June 4, 2001).

¹⁹ See Ikenberry, *After Victory*, esp. pp. 3–20 and 257–74; quotation on p. 273.

²⁰ James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row Paperback, 1997), p. 19. This understanding of leadership is clearly Weberian and widely accepted today.

²¹ Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgot, and Kim Richard Nossal, “Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict,” *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1991), pp. 398 ff.

In a similar vein, the *Washington Post* editorialized against the new unilateralism during President Bush's first European visit in June 2001, arguing that if the national interest "is defined in a crabbed and narrow way, the policy is likely to fail over time." The editorial further observes that if the United States as the world's most powerful state "exercises its power on behalf of goals and values that others share—liberty, democracy, prosperity—the United States will be supported, not always but much of the time."²² In short, the less multilateralist the United States becomes, the more self-promoting, and therefore the less willing to lead responsibly, the less diffuse reciprocity will characterize its relationships with others, and the more others will try to fill the leadership void.²³ Simply put, the challenge for the United States is to "be a hegemon without acting like one."²⁴

By contrast, the kind of multilateralism that has been in place in Europe since the end of World War II is based on jointly agreed rules that have pushed cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic "into realms of interaction where it is usually absent."²⁵ This order could not have been maintained without the shared legitimacy of a set of political objectives to which all countries had moved after World War II—this is what John Gerard Ruggie called "embedded liberalism"—the commitment to democratic institutions and the preparedness of the United States and the European states to lock themselves in by establishing international organizations.²⁶ Allied Force reinforced the fact that many in the United States, and particularly among the current self-proclaimed unilateralists, were no longer willing to make that kind of multilateralist commitment. They seem to believe that while diverging Western foreign policy approaches are normal and will be reflective of the transatlantic relationship, the United States will prevail in the end.²⁷ There can be no doubt that military success in Kosovo depended on and showcased U.S. hard power capabilities. But Kosovo also made clear that the successful use of these capabilities is contingent upon the transparency, integration, and shared commitment of the NATO alliance, and the willingness of allies to grant the United States basing rights. In other words, the United States was able to employ its power so successfully largely because the multilateral architecture was in place for it to lead.

²² "Faint Foreign Policy," *Washington Post* (June 4, 2001).

²³ See Heiko Borchert, "Strengthening Europe's Security Architecture: Where Do We Stand? Where Should We Go?" in Heinz Gaertner et al. (eds.), *Europe's New Security Challenges* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 165–215 and Jim Drinkard, "Daschle: U.S. Role in World Slips," *USA Today* (July 19, 2001).

²⁴ The phrase was coined by Stanley Sloan, personal communication. See also: John Gerard Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3–47.

²⁵ Patrick M. Morgan, "Multilateralism and Security: Prospects in Europe," in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters*, pp. 327–64; quotation on p. 333.

²⁶ See John Gerard Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism and the Post-War Economic Regimes," in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization* (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 62–84.

²⁷ Ivo H. Daalder, "Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?," pp. 538–41.

U.S. Unilateralism: Resurgent or at Bay?

Given the United States' unchallenged military supremacy, many in the Bush administration concluded prior to September 11 either that the United States ought to continue to lead NATO based on its hard-power capabilities, or that it should disengage from NATO and the constraints it places on Washington. Only if the Europeans developed their collective military capabilities to a level on par with those of the United States, which is not expected, would they deserve to share equally in Allied leadership decisions. But even as the United States continues to encourage Europe to develop its own capabilities, it is debatable whether U.S. policy makers would really be willing to accept shared transatlantic leadership in the face of near equal European capabilities.

Further, the fact that the Europeans contributed heavily to Allied Force in a multitude of ways, but especially in the pre- and post-war fighting phases, is either irrelevant or ignored by such reasoning. Allied Force thus convinced many critics in the United States that NATO's assets are really U.S. assets and that being constrained militarily through the multilateral political mechanism of nineteen unequally contributing member states is unjustified. As one observer put it, "There are many in the military who question whether the political benefits gained by coalition warfare are sufficient to make up for the military disadvantages of the coalition."²⁸ This dismissive attitude of European efforts in turn fuels European sentiment to develop their own security framework, and also helps to crystallize the formulation of a distinct European security identity.

The unilateralist persuasion based on military power marginalizes Europe in another way as well. Beginning in the immediate post-Cold War period, during the elder Bush's presidency, America's strategic focus began to shift from Europe toward Asia. The major players of both the elder Bush and the Clinton administrations attempted to maintain the transatlantic core of U.S. identity in many ways, and incorporated the rhetoric of democratic peace arguments at every turn. Certainly, Clinton's decision to engage with NATO in Kosovo reflected the proclivity to maintain solidarity in the Euro-Atlantic area. Yet Asia, rogue states, and issues of globalization continued to emerge as new lodestones of U.S. security policy. For example, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review by the Pentagon stipulated the need for U.S. military forces to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. This strategy was reiterated in the Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, where the regions of focus were Iraq and North Korea, not Europe.²⁹ Not only did the two-war strategy come to form the core of Army doctrine, former SACEUR

²⁸ Colonel A. J. Torres, personal interview.

²⁹ Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), pp. 193–94; and Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000), esp. p. 237.

Gen. Wesley Clark reported that this shift led to serious shortages of U.S. forces available for the European theater during Allied Force.³⁰

The problems caused by the above process should be obvious. First, unilateralist tendencies among U.S. decision-makers led NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to warn of an unacceptable two-tier alliance that would threaten risk sharing.³¹ In Europe, perceived U.S. unilateralism leads to continued uncertainty about the foreign policy course of the Bush administration and resentment that Washington is pursuing “hegemony on the cheap.”³² Joylon Howorth argues, “Had the United Kingdom been convinced that NATO’s future in the post-Cold War world was secure, the St-Malo process might never have happened.”³³ To be sure, the Bush administration has modified its rhetoric substantially, but global unilateralism remains a powerful theme. Not only has U.S. policy toward China evolved in a way that echoes Cold War themes and thus evokes a vigilant, armed United States, Washington is seemingly turning its back on NATO’s 1999 New Strategic Concept, which endorsed a multilateral, multifaceted definition of Western security and a continued U.S. commitment to democratization and stability in Europe.³⁴

While Bush’s first trip to Europe in June 2001 was deemed a success by many observers simply because no public hostility was on display, the president did not back away from his unilateral decisions to reject the Kyoto Treaty and to revise or suspend the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Agreeing to disagree with the Europeans on these issues is hardly the way to achieve a multilateralist policy. While others argue that the U.S. remains a “loyal ally and friend” of Europe,³⁵ the lackluster response to Bush’s second trip to Europe underscored increasing European skepticism. September’s terrorist attacks muted this sentiment, of course, but did nothing to remove its underlying causes.

An interesting possibility is that the Europeans may choose to battle energized U.S. unilateralism in the transatlantic relationship by persistently invoking the New Strategic Concept, the hymn to multilateralism, in much the same way that they constantly invoked the 1967 Harmel Report when the Reagan administration strayed from the dual track while rearming the United

³⁰ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, pp. 47, 71, 141, 312–13, and 424.

³¹ See discussion by Steven Erlanger, “Europeans Say Bush’s Pledge to Pull Out of Balkans Could Split NATO,” *New York Times* (Oct. 25, 2000).

³² See speech by Richard A. Gephardt, “The Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations: Collaboration or Confrontation,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Washington, D.C., Aug. 2, 2001 (<http://democraticleader.house.gov>). For a discussion of U.S. hegemony on the cheap, see Christopher Hemmer, “Empire Without Tears,” p. 166.

³³ Joylon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge*, p. 48. St-Malo is a French town where Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac met in 1998 to issue a joint declaration on European security and defense policy. Since then, its name has become synonymous with Europe’s reinvigorated interest in this issue.

³⁴ For the New Strategic Concept, see “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Press Release NAC-S(99)65, Apr. 24, 1999 (<http://www.nato.int>).

³⁵ See, for example, Robert Kagan’s “A Good Week’s Work,” in *Washington Post* (June 18, 2001).

States in the mid-1980s. Thus a more “go-it-alone” administration may lead the Europeans to push the multilateralist transatlantic agenda even harder in order to lock in the Bush administration and limit its freedom of action.³⁶

Second, rather than emphasizing the truly multilateral nature of the Balkan interventions, the current unilateralist position focuses almost exclusively on the military dimensions, undervaluing the European contributions in terms of peacekeeping, diplomacy, institution building, and economic aid.³⁷ That many influential actors in the United States devalue the contributions of Europe in the Balkans has been reflected in countless instances. One example was the Byrd-Warner Amendment, adopted by the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1999 and narrowly defeated by the whole Senate that year. It essentially tied future U.S. aid contributions to Kosovo to proof that Europe was pulling its fair share of the burden. In truth, the EU covers about 90 percent of the financial costs of the ongoing peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, and European states collectively provide five times as many peacekeeping forces as the United States, or 80 percent of the KFOR forces.³⁸

At the same time the Allied Force and KFOR experiences did little to persuade many U.S. leaders to deal with Europe in any serious manner. When asked, upon Bush’s return from his first European tour, how he recommended bridging “that gulf between the Europeans and the United States in terms of making this alliance work,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld answered, “There is no Europe, in a sense.”³⁹ In other words, a dominant strain in post-Kosovo U.S. discourse is that Europe is still only a series of separate states that compose the whole. That a new type of multilateral order is emerging in Europe and is prominently on display in rebuilding Southeastern Europe simply goes unacknowledged.

Europe’s Emerging Multilateral Order

The unilateralist U.S. position provokes Europeans to “flee forward” toward more security cooperation.⁴⁰ One of the clear lessons of Kosovo for the European states is that multilateral cooperation works. For them, the ongoing intervention in Kosovo is another building block of a unified

³⁶ See Mary N. Hampton, *The Wilsonian Impulse: U.S. Foreign Policy, the Alliance and German Unification* (Westport, London: Praeger Publishers, 1996), pp. 143–46; and Thomas Risse, “U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community,” in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *American Unipolarity and the Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming Fall 2002).

³⁷ U.S. voices on this aspect are rare. For noteworthy exceptions see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay,” *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2000), pp. 157–70, and Ivo H. Daalder, “Europe” Rebalancing the U.S.–European Relationship,” *Brookings Review* (Fall 2000), pp. 22–5.

³⁸ On the Byrd-Warner Amendment, see Paul J. J. Wolfens, *Stabilizing and Integrating the Balkans* (Berlin: Springer, 2001), esp. pp. 67–8. See also Heinz Gaertner, “European Security, the Transatlantic Link, and Crisis Management,” in Gaertner, *Europe’s New Security Challenges*, pp. 125–48.

³⁹ Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to Jamie McIntyre of CNN, DOD News Briefing, June 15, 2001.

⁴⁰ Elizabeth Pond, *The Rebirth of Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999), p. 182.

Europe. Not only were EU member states largely united in their commitment to stopping Milosevic's actions in Kosovo,⁴¹ they took the opportunity to renew the call for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) promised ever since the Maastricht Treaty. Realizing the inadequate state of British and European security readiness and capability drove Tony Blair to seek greater European security cooperation, while Germany emerged as a willing—indeed, leading—European player in the Kosovo intervention. Under French and British authorship, the founding of the ESDP beginning in 1998–99 reflected the European determination to carve an autonomous security space for itself.

Before and especially since Allied Force, the EU has also been deeply involved in rebuilding the Balkans and taking the lead in the Stabilization and Association Process.⁴² These processes, together with the European-led peacekeeping operations, were instrumental in paving the smooth transition to the post-Milosevic era in Yugoslavia and blazing a path toward unprecedented supranational integration and interdependence. Overall it can be argued, as the German sociologist Ulrich Beck did, that Kosovo could be Europe's "military euro, creating a political and defense identity for the European Union in the same way as the euro is the expression of economic and financial integration."⁴³

The Kosovo experience also helped to propel Europe's multilateralist culture and identity. The unprecedented EU action of sanctioning Austria for an undesirable domestic electoral outcome, along with rulings by the European Courts of Justice and Human Rights reversing bans on gays in the British military and females in combat positions in the German military, demonstrated the ongoing surrender of sovereignty occurring throughout the EU.

Precisely because of the multilateral institutions within which European decisions are increasingly made, the combative contests for leadership typical of state behavior have been muted. Peter Katzenstein observes that "the institutionalization of power matters because it takes the hard edges off power relations." Through long-standing participation in institutions such as NATO, but especially the EU, "European states, and in particular Germany, have acquired collective identities that are significantly more international than before."⁴⁴ The result of the process is not the loss of sovereignty but the softening of national powers through institutionalization.

In short, while many in the United States are praising anew the virtues of sovereignty and freedom of action, Europeans are creating new patterns of world order through the day-to-day challenges of collective security

⁴¹ See Ischinger, "Kosovo: Germany Considers the Past and Looks to the Future."

⁴² For an in-depth discussion of the Stability Pact, see Bodo Hombach, "Is Western Cooperation Possible in the Next Decade? Lessons Learned and the Nature of New Challenges," speech at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Apr. 26, 2001.

⁴³ Roger Cohen, "In Uniting over Kosovo: A New Sense of Identity," *New York Times* (Apr. 28, 1999).

⁴⁴ Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 3.

decision-making and multilateral peacekeeping. For the Europeans, the objective is directed toward further integration of the continent into the liberal democratic fold. The European project is also serving as a test case for post-Cold War leadership. It has often been assumed that only a hegemon can provide international leadership, and many in the United States continue to operate under the premise. However, as Robert Cox, John Gerard Ruggie, Jarrod Wiener and others have argued, once international normative structures are in place, there is no reason to assume that international leadership must depend on one state's material endowment. Rather, leadership may also be performed by non-hegemonic states.⁴⁵

Against this background, international relations analysts and policy makers in Europe argue that in the long run, the development of the European multilateralist integration project could lead to a sea change in international politics. The strong European emphasis on multilateral approaches and its preference for non-military means of conflict resolution could end up in a "security governance" approach better suited to the challenges of the post-Cold War world.⁴⁶ Since September 11 the Bush administration itself is obviously more favorably inclined towards multilateral action, if only to combat terrorism. However, should the current Bush team revert to its more internationally reluctant or disengaging mood, this trend could encourage the EU increasingly to challenge the United States for global leadership.

The Testing Ground for European Leadership

A related wedge issue in transatlantic relations that was reinforced by Kosovo involves the engagement of international institutions and regimes. The acceptance or rejection of international institutions as legitimate arbiters in matters of conflict or dispute is indicative of the relationship of international institutions to national power. As Josef Joffe maintains: "Hegemonic powers are loath to submit to international regimes they do not dominate. Lesser powers like such regimes precisely because they strengthen the many against the one."⁴⁷ Thus, for example, whereas the UN has grown in stature in Europe and other areas of the world since the end of the Cold War, its status in the United States has diminished. It is no coincidence that Europeans and other states in the international system believe that international institutions such as the UN should be strengthened.

⁴⁵ Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method," in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 124–43; John Gerard Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism and the Post-War Economic Regimes"; Jarrod Wiener, "'Hegemonic' Leadership: Naked Emperor or the Worship of False Gods?" *European Journal of International Relations* (June 1995), pp. 219–43; Jarrod Wiener, *Making Rules in the Uruguay Round of the GATT: A Study of International Leadership* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 20–61.

⁴⁶ Joylon Howorth, *European Integration and Defence*, pp. 87–91; quotation on p. 88.

⁴⁷ Joffe, "Who's Afraid," p. 48.

From their perspective, such institutions represent the limited options available to them for asserting some control over a United States that is increasingly unhinged from multilateral moorings.

However, international institutions also play a central role in the maintenance of stability in a multilateral order by legitimizing particular actions taken and principles upheld. For multilateralists, invoking the UN or other international organizations bestows collective legitimacy to interventions in a way that unilateral action or even coalitions of the willing cannot. Through the UN, interventions gain an international legal and normative status that they would not otherwise have.

The transatlantic operations in Kosovo provide a case in point. NATO intervened militarily in Kosovo without prior UN Security Council approval. Since Russia would have clearly vetoed the action in the Security Council, and since the majority of the allies viewed the situation as a humanitarian emergency, NATO intervened anyway. As Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon argue, however, that does not mean that the UN was excluded from the ongoing Kosovo interventions. To the contrary, the prospect of a Security Council resolution with Russian backing in the waning hours of the war and the direct UN control of the political rebuilding efforts bear witness to the continued centrality of the UN.⁴⁸

Against their preferred inclinations, and after much effort to avoid it, many European governments agreed to the execution of Allied Force without a UN mandate. For example, the French, Italian, British, and German governments were all, to a greater or lesser extent, keen on obtaining Security Council authorization for the use of force. Not only were German policy makers from the Social Democratic/Green coalition government reluctant to use force without a mandate, but in the face of open Russian disapproval, they were later repentant of having intervened without a UN mandate. For many in the German elite, obtaining a UN mandate is not only proper, but constitutionally required. Therefore, one of the lessons learned by many German and other European decision-makers is to ensure that similar future interventions receive UN backing.⁴⁹

The United States was much more willing to forgo UN approval in determining to intervene with force. Washington argued that "the rule requiring a UN mandate was neither sacrosanct nor absolute."⁵⁰ Since Allied Force, and in contrast to the German example discussed above, many U.S. policy makers have learned the lesson that Allied Force was a useful precedent for future interventions with regard to bypassing the UN. This

⁴⁸ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1999), pp. 128–40.

⁴⁹ See Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*; and Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need A Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001). On p. 34, Kissinger remarks that German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer envisions a role for the UN in German foreign policy that might in some cases surpass that of NATO.

⁵⁰ Ivo H. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 45.

interpretation is also reflected in a number of recent decisions that highlight Washington's vanishing support for multilateral obligations and international institutions. Among them are the Senate's "no" to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the rejection of the Kyoto Treaty, reservations with regard to the Rome treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, and the refusal to join the Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines.⁵¹ As John Ikenberry has noted, the more U.S. "power peeks out from behind these institutions, the more that power will provoke reaction and resistance."⁵² Should the United States continue to assert its sovereign interests outside the restraints of international institutions, it can therefore be expected that it will collide more frequently with Europe and reinforce its preference for pooling sovereignty through multilateral channels to counter U.S. unilateralism and to maintain international order.

Europe's Hard Power Problem

Despite the perceived U.S. unilateralism and the successes of European multilateralism, Europe's integration process continues to suffer from diverging national preferences on a host of critical security issues. Many advocates of European multilateralism attempt to overcome this fundamental quandary by creating new rules, procedures and forums. In some ways, European advocates of multilateralism mirror the mistaken assumptions made by U.S. unilateralists: where American unilateralists assume that multilateralism diminishes national power, European multilateralists assume that multilateralism can be a *substitute* for national power.

The end of the Cold War has left many questions of power capabilities and positioning in Europe unanswered. The 2000 EU summit at Nice brought many of those simmering unresolved issues to a boil. It made clear that there are still issues that national governments will protect based on claims of sovereignty, that competition for leadership is growing intense, and that deep fissures remain regarding the future of transatlantic relations. It also revealed that policy makers in Europe are unwilling or unable to make substantive domestic political sacrifices in order to lead internationally or regionally.

The European integration process is further limited by the failure to address the continent's lack of a strategic concept and financing. By any measure, consensus about an EU Headline Goal (the decision to set up an intervention force of around 50–60,000 men ready within 60 days for a deployment of about twelve months) was hammered out extremely fast. However, assigning troops on paper is easier than deciding to use them on foreign soil. First, deploying troops in case of conflict requires the

⁵¹On the last two aspects, see P. Malanczuk, "The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What are the Consequences of Leaving the U.S. Behind?" *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2000), pp. 77–90.

⁵²Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 271.

development of a strategic culture, “defined as the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities.”⁵³ Second, the EU’s enlargement process is also about to shift the geopolitical outlines of the Union, thereby requiring new concepts to deal with potential “zones of turmoil.” Therefore it can be argued that the lack of a strategic concept at the EU level discourages the EU’s maturity as a foreign policy actor.

The lack of a strategic concept reveals the gap that currently exists between the ongoing preparations for achieving the military capability goals and the EU’s political objectives.⁵⁴ Closing the gap became more important with the Treaty of Amsterdam and its establishment of the so-called Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, peacemaking and crisis-management missions) as potential CFSP responsibilities. However, references in the Treaty of Amsterdam are themselves vague: precise policy guidelines for developing serious operation plans are lacking as are clear guidelines for establishing political consensus at home, a prerequisite no EU-sponsored military mission can afford to miss. In short, a European strategic concept would require the EU member states to clarify their common interests by defining when, where, and how they will be prepared to use their broad spectrum of political, economic, and military instruments to project stability, prevent conflicts, and if necessary, intervene to resolve them.

Should European policy makers be able to specify their shared interests, creating a strategic concept could have a least two very useful side effects. First, it would help to bridge the conceptual dichotomy between military and non-military means of conflict resolution. Second, a European strategic concept could initiate a top-down planning process leading to a more efficient use of scarce resources. But that only raises a second problem: funding the EU member states’ armed forces.⁵⁵ Recent assumptions show “EU build-up costs for a European global power projection of some EUR 230–70 billion (primarily command, control, communication and intelligence capacity and air and naval transport) and additional build-up costs for a European global power status of EUR 60–150 billion, expressed in 2001 prices.”⁵⁶ But despite a growing need, defense spending in Europe has

⁵³ Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture,” *International Affairs* (July 2001), pp. 587–603; quotation on p. 587.

⁵⁴ Alfred van Staden, Kees Homan, Bert Kremmers, Alfred Pijpers, and Rob de Wijk, *Towards a European Strategic Concept* (The Hague: The Netherlands, Institute of International Relations, 2000), p. 5. See also François Heisbourg, “Europe’s Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity,” *Survival* (Summer 2000), pp. 5–15.

⁵⁵ On the prospect of growing convergence between the EU’s security and development policy, see Cornish and Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy,” pp. 599–602. On funding, see Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, *Europe’s military revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001), pp. 53–72.

⁵⁶ Simon Duke, “Assessing the EU’s Progress on the Path to a European Security and Defence Policy,” *Eipascope*, 2/2001, pp. 23–6; quotation on p. 25.

declined in real terms since the late 1980s. Although joint military projects bear a great potential for speeding-up Europe's military integration, there remain serious difficulties to finance them. The Airbus A400-M heavy-lift transportation aircraft is a good example. It is undisputed that the aircraft would help overcome Europe's strategic airlift deficiency. But German funding problems are threatening the project, Turkey has cut its order by half, Italy was hindered from signing the basic memorandum of understanding because of parliamentary elections, Portugal refrained pending a government funding review, and the U.K. threatened to draw back if Germany did not come to terms.⁵⁷ Such inaction reinforces the already prevalent perception in Washington that the Europeans still have "a lack of real commitment to defense."⁵⁸

Tight budgets, the evolution of mature and demanding domestic investments in social policies, and growing domestic unease about the need for and use of military forces continue to handicap European governments in their quest to forge ESDP. Yet the growing realization that Europe's military challenges cannot be met by a single country and that the transatlantic relationship may not be dependable sustains the movement to redesign Europe's military forces, while Kosovo reinforced the desire to abandon national military forces in favor of continental integration. The integration process could lead to a real division of labor in which every member concentrated on its military core competencies, enhancing effectiveness, economies of scale, and saving money.⁵⁹

Conclusion

The lessons of Kosovo have reinforced trends on both sides of the Atlantic that threaten Western cohesion. Most important are the differences that emerged with regard to multilateral vs. unilateral foreign policies and the value of military vs. non-military means of conflict resolution. These differences illuminate a deep and growing divergence in the understanding of power and order. Europe seeks to establish a new order without adequately addressing the underlying questions of power. The Bush

⁵⁷ Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Der Luftikus. Verteidigungsminister Scharping ordert den Transporter A400M, obwohl im das Geld dafür fehlt," (The High-flyer. Defense Minister Scharping orders A400-M transportation aircraft despite the lack of money), *Die Zeit* (July 21, 2001); Craig Hoyle, "European projects receive limited backing," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (June 27, 2001).

⁵⁸ On U.S. hopes and concerns about ESDP see Stanley Sloan, *The United States and European Defence* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000), pp. 40–8.

⁵⁹ Charles Grant, *European Defence Post-Kosovo?* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999), p. 10; Andréani et al., *Europe's military revolution*, pp. 64–71; Bertelsmann Foundation (ed.), *Enhancing the European Union as an International Security Actor. A Strategy for Action by the Venusberg Group* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2000), pp. 63–70; Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden, "The arithmetic of defence policy," *International Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 3 (July 2001), pp. 509–29; Rachel Anne Lutz, *Military Capabilities for a European Defence* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), pp. 42–76.

administration is pursuing power narrowly defined while allowing its multilateral leadership to erode on many fronts save that of counterterrorism.

From a European point of view military interventions, as witnessed in the Balkans during the last decade, will become less necessary the more political and economic instruments foster integration of the former communist countries. The logic of this process rests on a continued transfer of sovereignty from member states to supranational bodies. States that become members of this integration process “allow outside interference in their domestic affairs because they get something in return: influence on a supranational level of governance.”⁶⁰ Usually, these interventions are political, judicial, or economic. The problem in this approach is that it sidesteps the critical questions concerning national power capabilities that still tug at the integration process. Until underlying issues of power are addressed, the order currently being constructed in Europe is likely to remain regional only, and still partly dependent on the United States.

Americans took away very different lessons from the Balkans. For many, it was proved that the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs has rendered the U.S. military competent to strike from high above, suffer no losses, and return undamaged to its bases. If any constraints on its reach still existed, they were precisely the *political* entanglements resulting from the multilateral transatlantic alliance. For these critics, unilateralism frees U.S. power from the tethers of institutions in pursuit of globalized national interests. International order thereby suffers at the expense of American power projection, which in turn makes that power more costly to maintain as former partners increasingly become potential challengers.

The damage may, in the end, not be all that severe. Europe’s budgetary constraints and its mostly positive history of transatlantic ties constrain most European leaders from promoting a drastic snapping of the American relations. In the United States, political constraints and a similar homage to NATO’s success tend to pull the Bush administration back toward the transatlantic status quo. The administration’s huge tax cut, calculated according to domestic political considerations, is clearly constraining the administration’s ability to meet its campaign promises to the Pentagon that “help is on the way.”⁶¹ After September 11, the mood favored increasing military spending. However, this could change again if the recession deepens. The Democratic Senate will likely limit the administration’s ability to move forward on some of the most controversial unilateralist initiatives, such as missile defense. Similarly, the administration continues to be bound by the complex of organizational actors committed to the transatlantic relationship. Kosovo, for instance, revealed the depth of the State

⁶⁰ Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen, “International Relations Theory in a World of Variation,” in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 187–206; quotation on p. 204.

⁶¹ See “Please Sir, The Dog Ate My Surplus,” *Economist* (Aug. 4, 2001), p. 39.

Department's identity with Europe even as it illuminated the Pentagon's inclination to hold European problems at arm's length. In short, the potential for the Bush administration to veer from the multilateralist, Eurocentric course is already being impeded.

This analysis points to a number of reforms that need to be taken in the transatlantic security relationship to ensure its health for the short term. First, the Janus face of the ongoing discussion about Europe's military deficits must be overcome. On the European side concrete decisions are needed to develop a sustainable level of hard power required to make Europe's soft power more credible. For the United States, closing the technology gap requires conditions that are more favorable to transatlantic cooperation in defense-related industries and the sustained willingness to share relevant high technology.

Second, transatlantic discussions of burden sharing need to be broadened. Both sides, and Washington in particular, need to take into account the broader spectrum of diplomatic, economic, and military actions that have already been put in place. As Malcolm Chalmers has suggested, the debate should stick to the principle that each member of the transatlantic community must make a contribution to address common challenges, but otherwise promote flexibility regarding who does how much and in which dimension.⁶²

Third, the new transatlantic consensus forged through the New Strategic Concept needs to be reconfirmed or renegotiated. Ivo H. Daalder and John Goldgeier argue that many Europeans rate NATO's continuing value according to the contribution it can make toward the institutionalization of the continent.⁶³ That would imply a continued transformation of the Alliance from the defense of territory to the export of stability through Balkan engagement and East European enlargement. Those tasks would reveal a willingness on the part of the United States to adopt European concerns as its own and to continue to lead so long as Europe showed a continued willingness to defer to that leadership.

Fourth, as Christoph Bertram has argued, the real challenges lie in "out of area" places such as the Middle East and Asia, where Washington and its European partners have not yet cooperated or even forged institutional mechanisms to further cooperation.⁶⁴ Joint approaches therefore need to be worked out that take into account Washington's concerns with regard to certain states and Europe's preference for multilateral, legally based approaches.

Finally, while the above recommendations address the short-term necessities of getting the NATO relationship right, the medium and long

⁶²Malcolm Chalmers, "The Atlantic burden-sharing debate—widening or fragmenting," *International Affairs* (July 2001), pp. 569–85.

⁶³Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First," *Survival* (Spring 2001), pp. 71–91.

⁶⁴Christoph Bertram, "Starting over again," *NATO Review* (Spring 2001), pp. 12–4.

terms demand much more rigorous debate. As suggested at the beginning of this article, the Balkan interventions symbolized the maturing of a new assertive Europe. The new Europe has a long way to go in achieving the power capabilities needed to underwrite its emerging order. Should it succeed in that quest, it will demand the mantle of shared leadership always promised by U.S. policy makers. In the meantime it is critical that the transatlantic Allies attempt to reach an understanding concerning the parameters of the next international order.⁶⁵ To do that, both sides need to start by defining and establishing a basis for genuine joint leadership in and beyond NATO.



⁶⁵ Charles A. Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective," *Survival* (Summer 2000), pp. 16–32.