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**The Future of Europe's Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
and the Limits of Intergovernmentalism**

"The (not so) Common European Security and Defense Policy"

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*"The European Union is, like it or not, a global actor;
it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security."
Draft EU Security Strategy¹*

*"Half-way integration means half-way power."
Fraser Cameron²*

The conference organizers ask whether there is a way from cacophony to harmony in ESDP. My answer to this question is a strong "yes." Implementing this affirmative response, however, requires more, rather than less Europe in terms of foreign, security and defense cooperation. The purpose of the following food for thought thesis is to stimulate discussion on this issue by suggesting several ways to achieve "more Europe." The paper centers around four basic issues:

- Despite recent rifts, the transatlantic relationship has not become obsolete. However, none of the partners should take cooperation for granted. Both sides need to work hard to put their partnership on a new basis.
- The draft of an EU security strategy submitted by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, is a promising start. It should be developed further and implemented with vigor, thereby addressing existing shortcomings, such as the mix of interests and instruments and cooperation with other international organizations.
- Europe already has an impressive reservoir of security capabilities, but it also suffers from key shortcomings. In order to overcome existing deficits, role specialization and the pooling of resources should be embraced wholeheartedly across the whole spectrum of foreign and security policy tasks.
- ESDP is about the consistent mix of civilian and military means to address the security risks and threats of today and tomorrow. This requires a higher degree of "jointness" among the different actors involved, thus leading to an increased need for integrated security policy. This requires harmonization of national and international planning and decision-making processes.

¹ *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, S0138/03, Brussels, 20 June 2003; available from <<http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>> (accessed 25 August 2003), p. 2.

² Fraser Cameron, *An EU Strategic Concept*, EPC Issue Paper No 4 (Brussels: The European Policy Centre, 2003), p. 28.

The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

Thesis 1

The current U.S. foreign policy is unsustainable. Domestic and international requirements will lead to a U.S.-European rapprochement. However, the age of cozy transatlantic relations is over. Both sides need to work hard to reinvent traditional bonds.

The current state of the transatlantic partnership has caught the interest of students of international relations and of the public media alike. Various explanations have been presented in order to come to terms with the causes and the consequences of the most recent differences over some key policy issues (such as International Criminal Court, Kyoto Protocol, war on Iraq.).³ Among other things, it has been argued that the transatlantic partnership suffers from three power gaps:⁴ The first gap is the United States' overwhelming military power that dwarfs any near competitor. Different threat perceptions among transatlantic allies have led to diverging spending and investment patterns. This, in turn, has created a gap in military capabilities. The second gap concerns the transatlantic community's ability to influence events based on cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions – or soft power.⁵ The transatlantic soft power gap does not follow from a shortage of capabilities, but rather from an increasing proclivity of both partners to use their soft power capabilities against each other in what seems to become a useless "soft power rivalry." Finally, existing hard and soft power capabilities have not yet found an adequate institutional home. NATO remains the preeminent organization to fight military threats. However, the security agenda of the post-Cold War has widened dramatically, thus pushing the EU-U.S. dialogue to the fore as an alternative platform for discussion of the new security risks. This dichotomy between military and civilian approaches is detrimental to effective solutions to today's challenges.

Whatever solution will be found to overcome these gaps – most recently a number of experts have advanced ideas for a new transatlantic treaty, or a new Atlantic Community Treaty Organization, as a soft power framework to complement existing institutions⁶ – progress will be impossible without substantial pol-

³ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review* 113 (2002), pp. 3-28; William Wallace, "Europe, the Necessary Partner," *Foreign Affairs* 80:3 (May/June 2001), pp. 16-34; James B. Steinberg, "An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations," *Survival* 45:2 (Summer 2003), pp. 113-146; Philip H. Gordon, "Bridging the Atlantic Divide", *Foreign Affairs* 82:3 (May/June 2003): 70-83; Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2002); Ivo H. Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," *Survival* 45:2 (Summer 2003), pp. 147-166.

⁴ Stanley R. Sloan and Heiko Borchert, "Mind the Three Transatlantic Power Gaps: How a New Framework Can Help Reinvent the Transatlantic Relationship," *Connections 2* (forthcoming).

⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," *Foreign Affairs* 82:4 (July/August 2003), pp. 74-89; Hans-Gert Pötering and Ludger Kühnhardt, "EU-USA: Plädoyer für einen Atlantischen Vertrag,"

icy changes in the United States and in Europe. Washington needs to get back on its traditional course of remaining locked in international commitments and multilateral institutions. It needs to underline that it cares for allies, not only as "satellites," but also as long-time strategic partners in order to address current challenges.⁷ Failing to act along these lines will not only undermine U.S. legitimacy and credibility. In the long-term it will also produce the kind of political counterweights that the U.S. national security strategy seeks to avoid. Europeans, on the other hand, must make sure that deeds follow their words. As will be argued below, the draft treaty for a European constitution and Solana's draft security strategy contain many good ideas in this direction. Implementing these ideas, however, will require Europe to say good-bye to a long held tradition of intergovernmental security and defense policy-making in favor of a strong backing of its supranational institutions.

The Future of Europe's Security Strategy

Thesis 2

The draft EU security strategy is a welcome step into the right direction. It has many strengths, but it falls short on two important aspects: it does not address how the EU's wide array of instruments should be used and the need for closer inter-institutional cooperation.

The authors of "A Secure Europe in a Better World," the first draft of the EU's security strategy, must be commended for a job well done. Stating right at the beginning the obvious truth that the EU is a global actor, the paper

- analyzes the key strategic threats that need to be addressed (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states and organized criminality) and
- identifies Europe's strategic objectives (stability and good governance, international order based on multilateralism, tackling old and new threats).⁸

The authors underline Europe's preference for rules-based international politics, but they also contend that there might be situations that could require preemp-

integration 26:3 (July 2003), pp. 244-250; Ronald D. Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 82:5 (September/October 2003), pp. 20-31; Sloan/Borchert, "Mind the Three Transatlantic Power Gaps;" Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community. The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 217-227.

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power. Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Madeleine K. Albright, "Bridges, Bombs, or Blusters?" *Foreign Affairs* 82:5 (September/October 2003), pp. 2-19.

⁸ *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, pp. 2-10.

tive engagements. They also make it clear that for Europe to achieve its goals, substantial changes will be needed. The draft wants Europe to become more active in pursuing its strategic objectives, demands greater coherence in bringing together different instruments and capabilities, and pledges more resources for defense, stronger diplomatic capability – including the idea of pooling existing diplomatic resources – and improved sharing of intelligence. But at least two aspects did not receive enough attention in the current draft and need to be dealt with in greater detail in the final document to be submitted by the end of the year: the systematic use of all instruments available to the EU and cooperation with other international organizations.

Use of available instruments: The EU security strategy must clarify when, where, and how the Union can make optimal use of its various foreign and security policy instruments. Although progress has been achieved on increasing conceptual coherence, much more must be done. While it would be inadequate for a strategy to get into the operational details of policy implementation, a stronger emphasis on broad policy guidelines is needed. To this purpose the following questions should be answered: What are the Union's zones of primary interests? What policy mix is best suited to address these zones? What instruments should be used in which situation? What are the Union's favored instruments for preemptive engagement? When and where is preemptive engagement necessary and reasonable? How can Union activities for security sector reform in potential pockets of crises be combined with other CFSP and ESDP activities? What lessons can be learned from the Union's Stabilization and Association Agreements for the pacification of other strategic areas?

Inter-institutional cooperation: The security strategy is right to acknowledge that the Union will have to cooperate with others to achieve its goals. However, the strategy puts too little emphasis on strategic partnerships with the UN, the OSCE and NATO. The EU, the UN, and the OSCE are a perfect trio, because their security approach is based on a comprehensive understanding of security and a preference for rules-based politics. The OSCE in particular is active in regions that will border with an enlarged Union. The Vienna-based organization should thus become a key partner, with whom the EU enters into dialogue on joint planning and joint deployment of missions and other field activities. Field missions of the OSCE that are active on the spot can be used as "intelligence antennae" to provide both organizations with feedback on how to adapt their programs to achieve optimal outcomes.⁹ The same can be said with regard to

⁹ Heiko Borchert und Daniel Maurer, "Kooperation, Rivalität oder Bedeutungslosigkeit. Fünf Szenarien zur Zukunft der Beziehungen zwischen OSZE und EU," in Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg/IFSH (Hrsg.), *OSZE-Jahrbuch 2003* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, forthcoming).

EU-NATO relations. The agreement that was signed in late 2002 was a milestone in advancing mutual cooperation. Since St. Malo, discussion on the future of this relationship has focused overly on perceived competition, rather than on mutual support. NATO can avail itself of those military capabilities that the EU has so far been lacking. NATO's Partnership for Peace Program is essential in increasing military interoperability, which is a prerequisite for EU- and NATO-led operations. In addition, NATO is already active in potential zones of EU interests – such as Iraq and Afghanistan – thus stabilizing these areas to the benefit of the Union. To capitalize on these experiences, both organizations should gear-up their cooperation activities in order to agree on joint areas of cooperation and a division of labor to project peace and security to regions of common interest.

The Future of Europe's Security Capabilities

Thesis 3

Role specialization and pooling of resources should be embraced across the whole spectrum of ESDP and CFSP tasks. Unleashing the potential of these approaches requires more "jointness" at the European level and thus more supranational integration, rather than intergovernmental cooperation.

In a situation where public households run dry but key capability shortfalls demand substantial remedies, role specialization and the pooling of resources have been advanced as potential avenues for the future. Both approaches also have a strategic dimension, because they can help address existing capability shortfalls in a systematic way. Role specialization builds on the fact that Armed Forces dispose of comparative advantages. The more a country could concentrate on providing and maintaining these advantages, the more it would be freed from providing distracting services. As more countries join the team, each brings valuable competencies to the table and benefits from the strengths of the other partners. Pooling of resources works in a similar way. By bringing together existing resources or competencies, synergy potential can be unleashed, thus providing extra benefit to all partners engaged in pooling efforts. While pooling has been favored in the joint procurement of scarce capabilities, as in German-UK cooperation on suppression of air-enemy defense (SEAD) and the Dutch-Belgium merger of maritime commandos, role specialization was advanced by individual countries, for example Czech capabilities for protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks (CBRN).¹⁰

¹⁰ For these and other examples, see: Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, *Europe's Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2000), p. 64 f.; Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden, "The arithmetic of defense economics", *International Affairs* 77:3 (July 2001), pp. 509-529, here p. 520-522; Charles Grant, *European defence post-Kosovo?* (London: Centre for European Re-

It goes without saying that both approaches create new opportunities and new threats, as shown in Table 1.¹¹ Most importantly, both approaches will substantially encroach upon national sovereignty in security and defense policy. There must be an international body that identifies the capabilities that are in short supply and addresses the countermeasures in a way that guarantees effective and efficient use of scarce resources. Furthermore the same body must also be responsible for planning joint procurement and maintenance of these capabilities. As long as the European Union does not have any supranational capabilities, the same body will also have to provide for "redundant planning," because the withdrawal of a key capability by one nation might endanger a European operation. At the moment, two options seem plausible. The new European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency could provide the relevant services.¹² This is, however, only an intergovernmental body. Joint plans could thus clash with national priorities, especially where interests of the national defense industry are involved. The more promising long-term alternative is thus the EU Military Staff or a potential EU Headquarters that would be more supranational in nature.

Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Division of labor makes it possible to systematically address existing capability shortfalls (e.g., through assigning lead-nation roles) • Focus on core competencies allows for efficient and effective use of scarce resources (e.g., through the reduction of redundancies) • Problems of harmonization and synchronization in capability procurement can be overcome 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflicting national interests, diverging national security policy cultures and different threat assessments can endanger consensus-building • Domestic resistance to be expected in case of entering into strategic partnerships with other nations that are perceived as limiting the national leeway or when national capabilities are given up (e.g., job losses) • Without top-down planning and management processes, harmonization and synchronization problems will persist, and there is a danger of "white spots," e.g., capabilities that nobody wants to provide

Table 1: Opportunities and threats of role specialization and pooling of resources

form, 1999), p. 10; Rob de Wijk and Maartje Rutten, "Output Criteria," in François Heisbourg (ed.), *European defence: making it work* Chaillot Papers No. 42 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000), pp. 80-87.

¹¹ Andréani/Bertram/Grant, *Europe's Military Revolution*, p. 64 f.; Alexander/Garden, "The arithmetic of defense economics," pp. 520-522; Heiko Borchert und René Eggenberger, "Selbstblockade oder Aufbruch? Die Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU als Herausforderung für die Schweiz", *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 40:1 (January/February 2002), pp. 27-36, here p. 29-30; Charles Grant, *European Defense Post-Kosovo?* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999), p. 10 f.; Hans-Christian Hagman, *European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities*, Adelphi Paper 353 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 90-92; Rachel Lutz Ellehuus, *Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialization*, DUPI Report No. 2 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 2002).

¹² Article III-212, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July 2003.

The use of role specialization and pooling of resources should, however, not be confined to military matters. The same principles can also be applied in the much broader field of foreign and security policy. The draft EU security strategy has already hinted at this possibility by referring to the idea of pooling diplomatic capabilities.¹³ Other examples could include:

- Joint resource pools in the field of development policy, including joint planning, joint maintenance of local infrastructure, joint program management processes and instruments. Such initiatives could also aim at tighter cooperation with the business sector, which can add specific competencies to economic development.¹⁴
- Pooling of resources for civil-emergency planning and consequence management, e.g., for natural catastrophes¹⁵
- Pooling of verification capabilities in the field of arms control and non-proliferation
- Pooling of capabilities for border control and to fight human trafficking
- Combine specific intelligence expertise in a European intelligence pool¹⁶

Thesis 4

The defense industry plays a key role in implementing ESDP. European planning and programming will benefit from the launch of the European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency, but more must be done to guarantee smooth cooperation with defense contractors.

There can be no doubt that the defense industry plays a key role in transforming today's Armed Forces and in providing the necessary capabilities.¹⁷ Besides tackling a demanding restructuring and consolidation agenda that was put forward by the end of the Cold War, the defense sector also needs to adapt to the new demands of modern warfare.¹⁸ It has been recognized that European defense manufacturers suffer competitive disadvantages that stem from Europe's

¹³ *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, p. 14.

¹⁴ Andreas Wenger and Daniel Möckli, *Conflict Prevention. The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Juliette Bennett, "Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict," *Journal of International Affairs* 55:2 (Spring 2002), pp. 393-414; George C. Lodge, "The Corporate Key," *Foreign Affairs* 81:4 (July/August 2002), pp. 13-18.

¹⁵ This idea was most recently aired by European Commissioner Michel Barnier, who would like to create a joint European force to fight natural disasters. See: EUobserver.com, "Anti-catastrophe force mooted", 27 August 2003, <<http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=12448>> (accessed 28 August 2003).

¹⁶ A recent study argues that EU member states, such as Germany, France, and the UK, have intelligence collection capabilities that are complementary rather than overlapping, thus underlining the benefits of intelligence sharing. See: Adam Townsend, *Guarding Europe* (London: Centre for European Reform), p. 26.

¹⁷ For more on this, see: Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

¹⁸ Douglas S. Harned and Jerrold T. Lundquist, "What transformation means for the defense industry," *McKinsey Quarterly* 3/2003, pp. 50-63.

fractioned defense markets. The European Commission has launched several proposals to overcome these problems. The most recent Commission communication aims at advancing ideas for a "EU Defense Equipment Policy." Among other things, it foresees the need for harmonized European approaches to defense standardization, the monitoring of defense-related industries, a simplified licensing system to facilitate administrative procedures and harmonization of defense procurement rules.¹⁹

In addition to this initiative and other attempts to advance multinational defense industrial cooperation, Europe also needs a defense industrial policy similar to those adopted by individual member states. The UK defense industrial policy, for instance, focuses on the government's procurement criteria and outlines public expectations with regard to industry performance.²⁰ The UK has also gone a long way in partnering with the defense industry. Besides the maintenance of facilities and the provision of training and simulation capabilities, the UK Ministry of Defense has also started to use public private partnerships to procure strategic key capabilities, such as the new strategic tanker and the new air-craft carrier.²¹ Other European countries have followed this example.²² Although the trend towards outsourcing can yield beneficial results, it also creates new problems. In order to avoid a multitude of diverging national solutions, these problems should be solved at the European level. First, it makes sense to assess what kind of military services are specifically suited to outsourcing and to pool the respective services. Although there may be specific national conditions that need to be taken into account, a European approach comes with the benefit of leveraging the public sector's buying power vis-à-vis the industry. Second, it will be useful to adopt joint provisions for the regulation of private military companies that provide services to the frontline. Especially in the field of logistics, most countries work with their own companies contracted at home. This increases the need for coordination in the theater of operations. It should thus be analyzed whether it makes sense to pool all industrial logistics services and to coordinate them via European (or NATO) logistics cells. Finally, private military companies active in combat areas face specific risks that need to be

¹⁹ *Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy*, COM(2003) 113 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0113en01.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2003);

²⁰ *Defence Industrial Policy*, Policy Paper No 5 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2002).

²¹ Nick Cook, "Tanker PFI is a pathfinder for procurement," *Jane's International Defense Review* 38:1 (January 2003), pp. 43-47; David Mulholland and Richard Scott, "Carrier decision leaves everyone in murky waters," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 5 February 2003, p. 3. For a critical assessment of the UK outsourcing policy, see: Keith Hartley, "Problems of Using Partnering and Similar Private Sector Practice in the Public Sector Environment: The Example of PPPs/PFI," in Sue Arrowsmith and Martin Trybus (eds.), *Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp. 187-195; Keith Hartley, "The Economics of Military Outsourcing," *Public Procurement Law Review* 5/2002, pp. 287-297.

²² Michael Vetter, "Luftwaffe und Industrie – Eine strategische Partnerschaft in der Instandhaltung," *Europäische Sicherheit* 52:7 (July 2003), pp. 35-41.

covered. Here a European solution makes sense, because it would harmonize security regulations and streamline insurance solutions.

Thesis 5

Key industries, such as biotechnology, genomics, life sciences, and nanotechnology, need to be better integrated into the provision of security policy capabilities.

The discussion about military and security policy capabilities is inseparable from the respective science and technology (S&T) base. This link is obvious when we look at some of the most crucial capabilities in the areas of command, control, communications, and computers (C4) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which require sound knowledge in the fields of information and communication technology, sensor fusion, bandwidth, cryptology, and other S&T fields. Because of their dual use character, there is a growing dependence on the civilian industry, which sets the pace of innovation. Beyond this first area of cutting-edge dual-use technologies, there is a second area.

Although biotechnology, genomics, life science, and nanotechnology are part of the 6th EU Framework Program for Research and Technological Development,²³ which is funded with 13 billion Euro, there is no direct link between S&T activities covered by this program and Europe's search for adequate security policy capabilities.²⁴ To name but a few examples, biotechnology, genomics, and life science are of key importance in protecting against CBRN attacks, and nanotechnology makes it possible to invent new materials, make them more durable, increase their resistance, and reduce their weight, offering a broad range of benefits. Besides these security-related applications, biotechnology, genomics, and life sciences play an increasingly important role in the worldwide fight against hunger and underdevelopment. That said, it is high time to gear-up S&T efforts in these areas for the purpose of security policy by:

²³ *Integrating and strengthening the European Research Area (2002-2006)*, Adopted by the Council on 30 September 2002 and reprinted in: Official Journal of the European Communities L 294 (29 October 2002), pp. 1-43, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_294/l_29420021029en00010043.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2003).

²⁴ On the military and security policy relevance of these fields, see: Gebhard Geiger, *Rüstungspotentiale neuer Militärtechnologien. Konsequenzen für internationale Sicherheit und Rüstungskontrolle* (Berlin: SWP, 2003); *Opportunities in Biotechnology for Future Army Applications* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001); Philip S. Antón, Richard Silberglitt, and James Schneider, *The Global Technology Revolution. Bio/Nano/Materials Trends and Their Synergies with Information Technology by 2015* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).

- addressing this gap in the EU strategies for defense-related industries and for life sciences and biotechnology;²⁵
- promoting military and security policy research under the umbrella of the EU research framework;
- tasking the new European agency for defense capabilities development, research, acquisition, and armaments to set up and coordinate research activities in these areas
- devising special procedures for the mutual exchange of knowledge and lessons learned in these dual use areas in order to overcome the traditional dichotomy between S&T for military and for civilian purposes.

The Future of Security Policy Planning and Decision-Making

Thesis 6

Implementing ESDP and CFSP in tandem will require a fundamental shift in mind set from security policy in stovepipes to an integrated understanding of security policy.

There are two different trends that increase the demand for integrated rather than fragmented security policy.²⁶ First, new security challenges blur the distinction between peace and war and between domestic and foreign matters.²⁷ Since the end of the cold war we have witnessed a new "security dilemma." Low intensity conflicts, or asymmetrical challenges, are on the rise. They break out within rather than between states and societies; they involve a growing number of rogue non-state actors; these non-state actors adhere to old ways of fighting war by using light arms and small weapons and bringing war into the cities, thereby injuring innocent citizens.²⁸ Addressing these low intensity conflicts requires a new type of operation that falls into the confines of military and police tasks, thus requiring a new form of security force that integrates existing military, police, and civilian capabilities. Second, there is a need for coherence among the EU's various instruments in the fields of trade, development aid, and foreign, security and defense policy. Harmonizing and synchronizing the appli-

²⁵ *Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy*, pp. 12, 17-18; *Life sciences and biotechnology. A strategy for Europe*, COM(2002) 27, Brussels, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/biotechnology/pdf/com2002-27_en.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2003); *Life sciences and biotechnology – a strategy for Europe. Progress report and future orientations*, COM(2003) 96 final, Brussels, 5 March 2003, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/biotechnology/pdf/com2003-96_en.pdf> (accessed 7 July 2003).

²⁶ For more on this, see: Heiko Borchert and Reinhardt Rummel, "Von segmentierter zu integrierter Sicherheitspolitik. Die EU25 nach dem Verfassungsvertrag," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 42 (2004, forthcoming).

²⁷ John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process", in Ashton B. Carter and John P. White (eds.), *Keeping the Edge. Managing Defense for the Future* (Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 2001), p. 268.

²⁸ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "Die Europäische Union, die ESVP und das neue Sicherheitsdilemma," *Welt-Trends* 38 (Frühjahr 2003), pp. 135-144.

cation of these instruments becomes more challenging in an enlarged Union. The draft treaty for a European convention was therefore right to advocate the creation of the post of European foreign minister, the increased use of qualified majority voting in CFSP, and finding new ways to finance external action.²⁹ It should be added, that more must be done at the conceptual level to increase the integration of the different EU policy areas and the cooperation with other intergovernmental, state and non-state actors.

Above all, the plea for integrated security policy requires a shift in mind sets that will lead to a comprehensive realignment of policy planning and decision-making processes (see thesis 7). Three core ideas lie at the heart of the concept of integrated security policy: network centrality, joint capabilities, and cooperability.³⁰

Network centrality: Students of security policy have so far applied the idea of network centrality to warfare. They have argued that the networking of sensors, decision makers, and shooters will help achieve "shared awareness, increase speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increase survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization."³¹ The basic principle behind this vision – i.e., the systematic interlocking by all relevant actors to create added value in fighting new risks – should be embraced as the core principle of and integrated security policy. Network centrality thus demands a smooth interplay among all

- security sector actors to advance cross-institutional cooperation;
- diplomatic, civilian, economic, and military instruments that can be used to prevent and fight conflicts and to provide post-conflict stabilization;
- levels of interaction, that is, sub-national, national and international, that need to be taken into account to reach consensus about what to do and how to implement joint measures.

Joint capabilities: There can be no doubt that Armed Forces, police, and border and other security forces will continue to require specific individual capabilities. However, the need to come up with a "force package" that is better adapted to the new challenges opens the door for identification of those capabilities that will be needed by the security forces involved. Capabilities that sup-

²⁹ Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July 2003, <<http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf>> (accessed 30 August 2003).

³⁰ For more on this, see: Heiko Borchert, "Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI): How to advance security sector reforms with the help of a new assessment and development framework", Paper prepared for the Annual Conference of the Working Group "Security Sector Reform," Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Berlin, 15-17 June 2003.

³¹ David S. Alberts, John J. Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare. Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CCRP, 2000), p. 2.

port network centrality will be key, such as C4ISR and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP). As most modern conflicts arise far beyond the homeland, there is an increased need for joint mobility at land, sea, and in the air. The lethality of the environment in which security forces operate demands joint capabilities in the fields of CBRN protection, (combat) search and rescue, and precision effects (including non-lethal weapons). Joint capabilities should be identified, procured, and maintained in a coordinated way. To this purpose, it makes sense to build on the idea of role specialization and pooling of resources among the different national and international security forces.

Co-operability: It has been argued that Armed Forces must become co-operable in the sense of functioning together more or less seamlessly as an "integrated actor."³² This pledge is all the more valid when we look at the combination of different security forces. Co-operability means that today's security forces must overcome their stovepipes and join forces in adopting a holistic perspective and setting-up joint planning and decision-making processes that cut across existing organizations. First, improved co-operability requires a higher degree of intelligence sharing in order to create converging threat assessments. Without consensus at this level, it will be impossible to agree on a joint strategy and to optimize funds, forces, and capabilities. Second, common standards for processes, structures, and material are needed. What NATO has achieved with regard to the interoperability of Armed Forces needs to be expanded to cover all security forces. Finally, joint training and exercises are indispensable to test the usability of joint doctrines, planning, and standards in practice.

Thesis 7

ESDP increases the need to harmonize national planning and decision-making processes. Here the notion of "network centric warfare" as a major challenge for politico-military relations should receive utmost importance when redesigning national and international institutions and decision-making processes.

With regard to multinational military cooperation, Marc Houben and Dirk Peters have pointed out that "the successful deployment of multinational units requires the synchronization of national decision-making procedures. (...) [I]n order to achieve synchronization, the character of national decision-making processes of the participating states has to be taken into account."³³ The prospect of applying

³² David C. Gompert and Uwe Nerlich, *Shoulder to Shoulder. The Road to U.S.-European Military Cooperation. A German-American Analysis* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2002), p. 1.

³³ Marc Houben and Dirk Peters, *The Deployment of Multinational Military Formations: Taking Political Institutions into Account*, CEPS Policy Brief No 36 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2003), <<http://shop.ceps.be/free/1038.pdf?>> (accessed 7 July 2003), p. 1.

the new EU treaty's provisions on flexible cooperation to the field of multinational forces increases the need to address this issue more seriously.³⁴ As was argued in thesis 6, this argument can be developed one step further by positing that ESDP will require comprehensive harmonization of national planning, budgeting, and decision-making processes.

Planning: Member states of the Euro-Atlantic area have a decade of experience in coordinating defense planning within NATO. By contrast, the EU has only recently embarked on dealing with security policy challenges and is just about to establish planning and certification processes of its own. However, the task of coordinating planning under the ESDP/CFSP umbrella will be more challenging, because the spectrum of instruments that need to be brought in line is much wider than within the Alliance. At the national level this increases the need to plan, implement, and evaluate security policy in an integrated way, meaning across different ministries and agencies. The public sector in most EU member states is not yet ready for network centric policy making. Although some countries have established national security councils to coordinate the respective policies (such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria), the organizational autonomy of the relevant ministries remains untouched, which opens the door for rivalry between the coordinating body and the "stovepipes." Besides the need to push back the influence of individual ministries and agencies in favor of more "jointness," EU planning goals and tasks – e.g., in the form of convergence criteria – need to be properly integrated into national policy goals and policy definition processes. In this context the adoption of role specialization and pooling of resources will increase the challenges for planners, because these approaches demand new ways to:

- assess national contributions (e.g., How to compare high tech contributions with "boots on the ground"?, How to compare different life-cycle costs with regard to the equipment contributed to multinational units? Is "check book diplomacy" accepted when "sharing the front line" is asked for?)
- evaluate the performance of multinational European units and
- establish controlling and reporting processes involving the necessary national and European organizations.

Budgeting: The more that security policy is planned, implemented, and evaluated in an integrated way, the harder it will get to continue to establish separate budgets for military forces, police forces, border control, or other foreign and security policy tasks. There is thus a growing trend in favor of comprehensive security budgets. This perspective will provide one of the few opportunities to

³⁴ Udo Diedrichs and Mathias Jopp, "Flexible Modes of Governance: Making CFSP and ESDP work," *The International Spectator* 38:3 (July 2003), pp. 15-30, here p. 29.

beef-up security spending at all. At the same time, security budgets could increase spending flexibility, because it will be easier to shift the focus from one "budget line" to another when they are summarized under the same heading. This, however, creates at least two new challenges. First, security budgets need to be set up against an interagency perspective, thus increasing the need to work across organizational boundaries. Second, comprehensive security budgets could encroach upon the rights of the parliaments. This highlights the need to adopt new ways of cooperation between the ministries and the parliaments and to strengthen the latter's capabilities to accomplish this task.

Decision-Making: International deliberations during NATO's Operation Allied Force and the run-up in the Security Council before the U.S.-UK attack on Iraq were ample proofs of decision-making problems in times of crisis and war. The more the EU gets involved in security issues, the more attention needs to be paid to the smooth cooperation between military and political decision-makers at the top level. Three issues will be key. First, decision-making under stress requires seamless communication among the capitals and their representations in Brussels. Among other things, this requires adequate staffing of the liaison offices, the provision of powerful data links between Brussels and the capitals, and the establishment of crisis-prone decision-making structures at the national level.³⁵ Second, technological innovations that support network-centric warfare can dramatically reduce the sensor to shooter cycle and thus the time available for decision-making at the military level. While this is beneficial to the conduct of military operations, the political side of the equation has not yet witnessed a "revolution in decision-making." There is thus an increasing danger of asymmetric decision-making processes at the politico-military interface. If both sides fail to address this issue, the effectiveness of effects based operations and the achievement of the overall political goals will be seriously hampered. Finally, as long as the European Union has no supranational forces of its own, this discussion also needs to take into account the differences among European political systems and styles of political decision-making. Institutional (in)compatibility and differing judicial requirements with regard to the use of force may thus accelerate or slow-down decision-making in times of crisis.³⁶

³⁵ For an in-depth analysis, see: Cord Meier-Klodt, *Einsatzbereit in der Krise? Entscheidungsstrukturen der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik auf dem Prüfstand* (Berlin: SWP, 2002).

³⁶ Houben/Peters, *The Deployment of Multinational Military Formations*, pp. 5-10; Alexander Siedschlag, "Nationale Entscheidungsprozesse bei Streitkräfteeinsätzen im Rahmen der Petersberg-Aufgaben der EU - Deutschland, Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Italien und Schweden", in Erich Reiter, Reinhardt Rummel, Peter Schmidt (Hrsg.), *Europas ferne Streitmacht. Chancen und Schwierigkeiten der Europäischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP* (Hamburg: Mittler, 2002), pp. 222-232.