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**The Security Dimension of  
Energy Infrastructure Security**

The “Security” of Energy Security  
Panel: Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection

NATO School in cooperation with IAGS  
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# What are we talking about?

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## Start with a proposal

- Energy infrastructure security (EIS)
  - is a **holistic approach** that
  - looks at **ends, ways and means**
  - to identify and explore natural energy resources and refine, store, transport and distribute the relevant products (**supply chain**).


## Remember

- Energy is **territorially** bound (pipelines, sea lanes)
- Despite market liberalization **public institutions** are key
- EIS requires **collaborative governance**

## We will look at the following security dimensions


- Institutional environment** to address EIS
- Role of existing safety/security **standards**
- EIS and **security sector reform**
- EIS and the role of **hard power**
- Cross-border** emergency management

# A “risky” business



World Oil and Gas Review 2007 (Rome: ENI, 2007), p. 219.

# EIS: A complex framework



# Get the institutional setting right

## Challenges

- The **institutional setting** to address CEIP with all relevant stakeholders is **not appropriate**.
- CEIP-relevant decisions are adopted in various fora, but implementation is **hardly monitored** with regard to **mutual interdependencies** between different policy areas

## Possible Answers

### Global approach

- Use the International Energy Forum (IEF) as the central platform
- EIS-related confidence-building
- Topics to be addressed:
  - Energy supply chain risk assessment
  - Exchange of best practice

### European approach

- Appoint EIS Coordinator
- Raise awareness, advance dialogue, create trust
- Advance interagency and “inter-policy field” cooperation

# Take stock of existing security standards

## Challenges

- **Lack** of common energy infrastructure safety and security **standards along** the **supply chain**
- **Diverging** regulatory approaches
- **Deregulation** and stimulation of competition can further **security** risks

## Possible Answers

### Assess existing standards

- Priority infrastructure projects
- CI sector interdependence
- ICT safety and security

### EI safety/security audits

- International financial lenders should request audits

### Regulation and security standards

- Incentives for security and safety investments?
- Need to regulate investments in critical European EI?
- EI solidarity with European partners?

# Bring SSR and EIS agenda together

## Challenges

The SSR agenda should be broadened with regard to the

- rationale for limited defense/security **spending**
- strict **separation** of security/defense forces
- scope of existing **capacity-building** programs

## Possible Answers

### Spending

- Spending on capabilities for EIS is positive
- Need for transparency-building with regard to dual-use spending for EIS and other tasks

### Focus: Capabilities not institutions

- Integrated capabilities maintained by armed forces and police
- Advance interagency interaction

### Capacity building

- Pay more attention to reform of judicial system and administration in light of specific demands of hydrocarbon sector

# Come to terms with the military dimension

## Challenges

- Acknowledge that energy infrastructure security has a military dimension
- On energy security, **EU** and **NATO** are **heading for different directions** which is detrimental to transatlantic solidarity and the EU's energy foreign policy
- "Ultima ratio"-argument for use of hard power is no longer enough

## Possible Answers

### Identify military tasks/capabilities

- CSBM
- Train and equip
- Intelligence sharing
- Surveillance
- Protection
- Continuity of services
- Consequence management
- CDE

### Advance EU-NATO cooperation

- Security/defense S&T programs
- Regional military cooperation with energy production and transit countries
- Mutual learning through exercises

# Strengthen cross-border crisis-management

## Challenges

- Lack of **mutual understanding** of crises management systems
- Lack of mutual understanding between **public and private crisis management centers**
- Not enough information about existing **capabilities**
- Not enough **training** on joint operations

## Possible Answers

### Cross-border common operational picture

- Link public and private crisis management center to advance situational awareness

### Critical EI exercises

- Train public-public, public-private, and private-private interaction  
Involve NATO's EADRCC

### Include EI-related emergency assistance into EU external energy relations

### Address reimbursement for private companies in case of cross-border assistance